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This Note argues that the Convention offers the most effective approach to combating corrup-
tion and that all states should sign and ratify it. Part I discusses corruption, explains its history
and its harmful effects, and describes international organizations whose purposes and principles
are directly opposed to the harm corruption is capable of perpetrating. Part II presents existing
approaches to combating corruption. Part III argues that all states should adopt the OAS approach.
This Note concludes that states can best combat corruption through the OAS approach because it
offers the most comprehensive and, therefore, the most effective of the existing solutions.
CONTROLLING CORRUPTION THROUGH COLLECTIVE
MEANS: ADVOCATING THE INTER-AMERICAN
CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
Robert H. Sutton*
The servants of the nation are to render their services without
any taking of presents .... To form your judgment and then
abide by it is no easy task, and 'tis a man's surest course to
give loyal obedience to the law which commands "do no ser-
vice for a present."1
INTRODUCTION
Corruption' of government officials has existed in multiple
forms for centuries throughout the world. 3 It is only within the
last thirty years, however, that the public has begun to call for a
systematic plan to eradicate governmental corruption.4 This
outcry began in earnest in the post-Watergate era of the early
1970S5 and led to the passage, in 1977, of the U.S. Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act ("FCPA").6 Since the emergence of this pub-
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Fordham University.
1. PLATO, THE LAWS 349 (A.E. Taylor trans., 1960) (emphasis omitted).
2. See Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 51
AM. POL. Sci. Rrv. 417, 419 (1967) (defining corruption as "behavior which deviates
from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close
family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of
certain types of private-regarding influence").
3. See NEIL H.JAcoBY ET AL., BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD BUSINESS: A STUDY
OF CORPORAa POLITICAL PAYMENTS ABROAD 7-43 (1977) (describing history of corrup-
tion of government officials in Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, India, Southeast Asia,
Latin America, Western Europe, communist countries, and United States); ROBERT
KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRuPTION 7 (1988) (stating "corruption is as old as govern-
ment itself' and citing example from 2300 years ago); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES XX-
xxii (1984) (stating that bribery has existed worldwide in multiple forms from approxi-
mately 3000 B.C. through present day).
4. See JAcoBY ET AL., supra note 3, at xiii-xv (discussing rise of public sentiment
directed against corruption of non-U.S. government officials in 1960s, cresting in post-
Watergate era of early 1970s).
5. Id.
6. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m(b), 78m(d)(1), 78m(g), 78m(h), 78dd-1,
78dd-2, 78ff(a), 78ff(c) (1988)). The U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act ("FCPA") in 1977 in response to the growing realization of the harms corrup-
tion causes. See S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977) (stating that, in free
market systems, "it is basic that the sale of products should take place on the basis of
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lic movement, commentators have analyzed the effects of cor-
ruption from a commercial and economic standpoint, noting
that corruption poses difficulties for all actors involved.7 Such
difficulties can range from a decrease in the efficiency of market
transactions to a general political destabilization of the cor-
rupted state.8 The Organization of American States ("OAS") 9
has recently proposed a solution to these problems in the Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption ("Convention"),10
adopting many themes contained in other previously-advocated
approaches." I
price, quality, and service" and that "[c] orporate bribery is fundamentally destructive to
this basic tenet").
7. SeeJACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 183-85 (discussing adverse effects of govern-
mental corruption on local economies and on corporations transacting with corrupt
governments); KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at 36-48 (discussing harmful effects of corrup-
tion on efficiency of market transactions, distribution of resources among market ac-
tors, motivations of government actors, and political stability of host state); Transna-
tional Bribery, 117 Bus. AM. 112, 112-14 (discussing corrupt environments and their ef-
fects on businesses and economies); Mark B. Baker, Private Codes of Corporate Conduct:
Should the Fox Guard the Henhouse?, 24 U. MIAI INTER-AM. L. REv. 399, 403-05 (1993)
(discussing adverse effects of governmental corruption on local economies). Some of
the problems corruption poses include distorting the natural functioning of market
competition, increasing production costs for producers, posing barriers to trade, and
creating an uneven distribution of wealth weighted to the upper classes. Baker, supra,
at 403-04; JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 183-85; Transnational Bribery, supra, at 112-13.
8. KLrrGAARD, supra note 3, at 36-48.
9. OAS CHARTER arts. 1, 8. The Organization of American States ("OAS") is a re-
gional agency within the United Nations and contains only Western Hemisphere in-
dependent states. Id. Article 52 of the U.N. Charter enables the creation of regional
agencies. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, 1-4.
10. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, OEA/Ser.K/
XXXIV.1 CICOR/doc.14/96 rev.2, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996) [hereinafter Convention].
The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption ("Convention") is a treaty aimed at
eradicating corruption among its signatories. Convention, supra, pmbl., at 727. It at-
tacks individual acts of corruption and the systems which permit corrupt acts to flour-
ish. Id. arts. VI-IX, XI, at 729-31. It also promotes cooperation among states in a collec-
tive effort to eradicate corruption. Id. art. XIII-XVI, at 731-32. The Convention is open
for accession by OAS member-states as well as by non member-states. Id. art. XXIII, at
733. Additionally, signatories may make reservations as to any specific provision, pro-
vided that such reservations are not incompatible with the Convention's object and
purpose. Id. art. XXIV, at 733.
11. See Michael Levi, Serious Fraud in Britain: Criminal Justice versus Regulation, in
CORPORATE CRIME: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 181, 181-98 (Frank Pearce & Laureen
Snider eds., 1995) [hereinafter CORPORATE CRIME] (discussing comparative effective-
ness of criminal versus regulatory measures in combating criminal acts in business
transactions); Gilbert Geis & Joseph DiMento, Should We Prosecute Corporations and/or
Individuals?, in CORPORATE CRIME, supra, at 72, 72-86 (discussing comparative effective-
ness of pursuing corporations versus individuals in criminal prosecutions arising from
criminal acts in business transactions). The Convention adopts both criminalization
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Some of these previously-advocated approaches are capable
of attacking corruption on a transnational level, striving for the
eradication of corruption through agreements among states' 2 or
through private codes of corporate conduct.1 3  Other ap-
proaches attack corruption on a purely state level, advocating
the use of regulatory measures instead of criminalization 14 and
targeting corrupt individuals instead of the corporations for
which they work.'5 One state-level approach, the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act,'6 adopts a combination of these other
state-level measures.' 7
This Note argues that the Convention offers the most effec-
tive approach to combating corruption and that all states should
sign and ratify it. Part I discusses corruption, explains its history
and its harmful effects, and describes international organizations
whose purposes and principles are directly opposed to the harm
corruption is capable of perpetrating. Part II presents existing
approaches to combating corruption. Part III argues that all
states should adopt the OAS approach. This Note concludes
that states can best combat corruption through the OAS ap-
proach because it offers the most comprehensive and, therefore,
the most effective of the existing solutions.
I. THE PROBLEMS CORRUPTION PRESENTS
To those taking part in international business transactions,
corruption is, and historically has been, apparent at all levels of
and regulatory approaches to fighting corruption and targets both the individuals and
the corporations involved. Convention, supra note 10, arts. III, VI-IX, at 728-30; see Id.
art. VI 1(e), at 729 (stating that Convention is applicable to "[p]articipation as a
principal, coprincipal, instigator, accomplice or accessory after the fact, or in any other
manner, in the commission or attempted commission of, or in any collaboration or
conspiracy to commit" any act of corruption that it lists).
12. Convention, supra note 10; Council Recommendation an Bribery in International
Business Transactions, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
C(94)75/FINAL (May 27, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1389, 1390-92 (1994) [hereinafter Bribery
Recommendation]; Recommendation of the Council on the Tax-deductibility of Bribes to Foreign
Public Officials, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, C(96)27/
FINAL (Apr. 11, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 1311, 1311-12 (1996) [hereinafter Tax Recommenda-
tion].
13. Baker, supra note 7, at 405-33.
14. Levi, supra note 11, at 181-95.
15. Geis & DiMento, supra note 11, at 72-85.
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government-producer relations.18 A free market economy19 re-
quires equal access for all market actors, ° yet barriers to free
trade, in the form of governmental corruption, 21 exist in profu-
18. NOONAN, supra note 3, at xxii. Recipients of corrupt payments:
[H]ave ranged from constables and sheriffs to the Speaker of the House (U.S.,
nineteenth century), the Speaker of the House of Commons (U.K, seven-
teenth century), the president of Honduras, the president of Italy, the prime
minister ofJapan, the prince-consort of the Netherlands, the Lord Chancellor
of England (seventeenth century).
Id. See JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 4-7 (discussing pervasiveness of corruption in
dealings with governments at all official levels); KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at 41, 44 (stat-
ing that "[p]ossibilities for corruption create nefarious incentives throughout the soci-
ety" and that these possibilities lead officials to "spend an increasing amount of their
time looking for ways to secure bribes and extort payments").
19. See Murray N. Rothbard, Free Market, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Eco-
NOMICS 636, 636 (David R. Henderson ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF ECONOMICS] (describing free markets). Rothbard defines "Free Market" as:
[A] summary term for an array of exchanges that take place in society. Each
exchange is undertaken as a voluntary agreement between two people or be-
tween groups of people represented by agents. These two individuals (or
agents) exchange two economic goods, either tangible commodities or non-
tangible services ....
Both parties undertake the exchange because each expects to gain from
it. Also, each will repeat the exchange the next time (or refuse to) because his
expectation has proved correct (or incorrect) in the recent past. Trade, or
exchange, is engaged in precisely because both parties benefit; if they did not
expect to gain, they would not agree to the exchange.
Id.
20. See Al Ehrbar, Supply, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, supra note
19, 86-87 (explaining how markets achieve balance between supply and demand); Roth-
bard, supra note 19, at 636-37 (explaining need for unhindered interaction in free mar-
kets). For a free market economy to function effectively, it must be free of barriers to
transactions. Rothbard, supra note 19, at 636-37. All market actors must have equal
access to each other in order to ensure that consumers and suppliers have achieved a
balance in what one is willing to exchange for what the other possesses. Al Ehrbar,
supra, at 86-87. Balance between consumers' and suppliers' willingness to exchange is
analogous to intersecting supply and demand curves:
A demand curve traces the quantity of a good that consumers will buy at vari-
ous prices. As the price rises, the number of units demanded declines. That is
because everyone's resources are finite; as the price of one good rises, con-
sumers buy less of that and more of other goods that now are relatively
cheaper. Similarly, a supply curve traces the quantity of a good that sellers will
produce at various prices. As the price falls, so does the number of units sup-
plied. Equilibrium is the point at which the demand and supply curves inter-
sect-the single price at which the quantity demanded and the quantity sup-
plied are the same.
Id.
21. See Rothbard, supra note 19, at 637-38 (analogizing negative effects of coerced
payments on individual market actors and on overall market to robbery at gunpoint).
Barriers to free trade, which are financial disincentives to entry into the market, dis-
courage market exchanges from taking place. Id. at 638. By protecting existing suppli-
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sion in many parts of the world,22 preventing local markets from
realizing their full potential .2  This has led to an environment in
which secret payments, instead of quality and price, may influ-
ence purchase decisions. 4 Ultimately, corruption has negative
implications beyond a simple market analysis, hobbling the pro-
gress of developing nations' economies, 25 eroding public confi-
dence in the host governments, and destabilizing them.2 6 There
are international organizations, however, including the OAS and
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD"),27 whose purposes and principles are directly opposed
ers from additional competition, these barriers can lead to a decrease in incentive to
innovate and to a general stagnation among existing producers. Robert Hessen, Capi-
talism, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, supra note 19, at 110, 113-14.
Tariffs, for example, by relieving domestic producers from foreign competition, are
capable of posing sizable costs to local economies. Douglas A. Irwin, Free Trade Agree-
ments and Customs Unions, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, supra note 19,
at 530. By requiring producers to pay bribes as a precondition to engaging in certain
transactions, the government actors requesting such bribes are imposing these addi-
tional costs on the producers. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 184-85.
22. JAcoY ET AL., supra note 3, at 4-43. Strong local ties to family and tribe, in
addition to low levels of remuneration for those in government service, has led to cor-
ruption's profusion throughout the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, India, Southeast
Asia, Latin America, Western Europe, and the United States. Id.
23. See KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at 39-41 (arguing that corruption of government
officials promotes economic inefficiency and inequitable distribution of resources);
Rothbard, supra note 19, at 638 (stating that coerced transactions ultimately lead to
.reduced productivity and living standards for all"). As some commentators have
noted, however, corruption can have beneficial results in certain limited circumstances.
KLrrCAARD, supra note 3, at 30-36; Nye, supra note 2, at 427. In situations where goods
or services are allocated by political ties, random selection, or some other criteria not
related to the supply and demand for these goods or services, "corruption may instead
allocate goods according to willingness and ability to pay." KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at
31. Corruption may also enable the circumvention of constraining bureaucratic regula-
tions, thereby speeding exchanges. Id. at 32. Despite such occasional benefits, com-
mentators have on balance found that "the harmful effects of corruption greatly out-
weigh the (occasional) social benefits." Id. at 36; cf. Nye, supra note 2, at 427 (stating "it
is probable that the costs of corruption in less developed countries will exceed its bene-
fits except for top level corruption involving modern inducements and marginal devia-
tions and except for situations where corruption provides the only solution to an impor-
tant obstacle to development").
24. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 183-84; KLITCAARD, supra note 3, at 39-41.
25. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 183-84.
26. See id. at 180-81 (stating that bribery of government officials causes such offi-
cials to place their own needs above those whom they serve); KLITGAARD, supra note 3,
at 44-46 (discussing adverse effects of corruption on public faith in and stability of polit-
ical institutions).
27. OECD CHARTER arts. 1, 3. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
development ("OECD") is an international body of states whose common goal is to
further worldwide economic growth and stability through collective means. Id.
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to the kinds of harm corruption poses. 8
A. Corruption in a Business and Historical Context
Corruption is an unavoidable element of many interna-
tional business transactions, evident at all levels of producer-gov-
ernment relations from dealings with lower-level bureaucrats
29
to upper-echelon political officials.3" The prevalence of corrup-
tion in international business transactions is not a recent phe-
nomenon.31 Government actors' exploitation of their positions
for their own personal gain has existed for centuries in many
parts of the world. 3
2
1. Corruption in International Business Transactions
Corrupt payments occur as a result of producers' as well as
government actors' impulses, occurring as much because of pro-
ducers' desire for special treatment as because of government
actors' desire for personal benefit.33 Corrupt payments also vary
in their objectives.34 They may facilitate otherwise normal gov-
ernment functions, secure special treatment, or avoid hard-
ship."5 One may define corrupt payments as transfers of objects
of value, the purpose of which is to influence the behavior of
public officials in their legislative, judicial, or administrative ac-
28. OAS CHARTER, arts. 2-3, amended by Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of
the OAS, Dec. 14, 1992 [hereinafter Protocol of Washington], reprinted in Organization
of American States: Integrated Text of the Charter as Amended y the Protocols of Buenos Aires
and Cartagena de Indias; the Protocol of Amendment of Washington; and the Protocol of Amend-
ment of Managua, 33 I.L.M. 981, 1010-12 (1994) [hereinafter Integrated Text]; OECD
CHARTER, art. 1.
29. SeeJACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 93-94 (discussing payments to rank-and-file
government employees).
30. See id. at 92-93 (discussing payments to major political leaders).
31. See id. at 4-43 (discussing history of corrupt payments worldwide); KLITGAARD,
supra note 3, at 7 (discussing corrupt payments in ancient India, China, and Greece);
NOONAN, supra note 3, at 3-424 (discussing instances of corruption worldwide from
3000 B.C. through 1800 A.D.).
32. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 4-43; KLrrQAARD, supra note 3, at 7; NOONAN,
supra note 3, at 3-424.
33. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 91; cf. NOONAN, supra note 3, at 3 (stating
"[r]eciprocity is in any society a rule of life, and in some societies at least it is the rule of
life").
34. SeeJAcoBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 101-17 (discussing purposes of corrupt pay-
ments); KLITCAARD, supra note 3, at 19-20 (discussing various purposes of corrupt pay-
ments in Philippines' Bureau of Internal Revenue in mid 1970s).
35. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 101-17; KLITCAARD, supra note 3, at 19-20.
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tions.3 6 More specifically, the goal of corrupt payments includes
influencing these government actors to fulfill their normal du-
ties, to fulfill them at a faster-than-normal rate, to refrain from
imposing hardships that the government actors have threatened
the commercial actors with, or to bestow some other special
treatment upon those individuals making the payments.3 7
Commentators have typically categorized corrupt payments
as bribery" or extortion," depending on which party to the
transaction is the source of the desire for payment.40 Most cor-
rupt payments occur because of impulses from both parties to
the transaction.4 1 Prior experience has taught the government
actor and the commercial actor that they may both gain by a
36. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 86. But see KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at 23 (not-
ing that "[d]efinitions are not static" and that "[s]ocieties' understandings of what
counts as 'corrupt' evolve").
37. SeeJAcoBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 101-17 (describing purposes of foreign polit-
ical in influencing conduct of government actors); KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at 19-20
(describing purposes of bribes given to officials in Philippine Bureau of Internal Reve-
nue in mid 1970s). Examples of hardships with which government actors may threaten
commercial actors include onerous changes in agreements with the host government,
artificially inflated, or extortionate, taxes, and a refusal to grant protection from an
unstable or criminally-minded civilian population. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 102,
110-11, 112-13; KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at 19. Examples of special treatment which
government actors may bestow upon commercial actors includes obtaining or retaining
business with the host government and approving a lower tax assessment than the com-
mercial actor merits. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 114-15; KLITGAtAD, supra note 3, at
19-20.
38. American Distilling Co. v. Wisconsin Liquor Co., 104 F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir.
1939); seeJACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 90 (discussing definition of bribery as making
of payments to others in hopes of influencing conduct). In 1939, the Seventh Circuit
noted that the Federal Trade Commission had applied the term "commercial bribery"
to sellers' practices "of secretly paying money or making gifts to employees or agents to
induce them to promote purchases by their own employers from the sellers offering the
secret inducements." American Distilling Co., 104 F.2d at 585.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (b) (2) (1994); seeJACoBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 90 (discussing
definition of extortion as one person's inducing another to confer benefit which other
person would not otherwise confer). Title 18, Chapter 95, of the U.S. Code defines
extortion, as it uses the term in Section 1951, as "the obtaining of property from an-
other, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, vio-
lence, or fear, or under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1994).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1994); American Distilling Co., 104 F.2d at 585. The
impetus for a bribe originates with the individual who confers the benefit, while the
impetus for extortion originates with the individual who receives the benefit. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(b)(2) (1994); American Distilling Co., 104 F.2d at 585; seeJACOBY ET AL., supra
note 3, at 90 (discussing differing definitions of bribe and extortion).
41. SeeJAcoBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 90-91 (stating that most corrupt payments
"are hybrids of the two types" of payments).
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surreptitious conferral of personal benefit.42
Corruption of government functionaries and officials is en-
demic to most, if not every part, of the world.4" While the
United States and many of the more developed nations of the
world permit the majority of corporate managers to function do-
mestically with little day-to-day interference from government of-
ficials," overseas commercial transactions often require fre-
quent contact with foreign bureaucracies. 45 The potential influ-
ence that lower-level administrators possess creates tremendous
discretionary power over potential and existing investors.46
International commercial enterprises are also concerned
with other aspects of foreign business environments that can
fundamentally affect the viability of the enterprises themselves.47
These factors include political risks that the instability or poten-
tial hostility of a host government pose,48 the local populace's
threats or harassment,49 intentionally extortionate taxes, ° and
difficulty in competing with other suppliers in obtaining or re-
42. See id. at 91-92 (comparing combination of impulses in such situations to that
which commonly occurs during "tipping" transactions, such as between travelers and
hotel bell captains); cf. NOONAN, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing universality among socie-
ties of reciprocity of exchanges).
43. See JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 4-43 (describing history of corruption of
government officials in Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, India, Southeast Asia, Latin
America, Western Europe, communist countries, and United States); NOONAN, supra
note 3, at xx (stating "[biribes are today universal; that is, every culture, with insignifi-
cant exceptions, treats certain reciprocities with officials as disapproved.").
44. JACOBY ET A.., supra note 3, at 4.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 4-5 (discussing role of lower-level functionaries in overseas transac-
tions). In the words of one commentator, these functionaries:
[P]rocess goods, machinery, and raw materials through customs. They issue
visas and work permits for company personnel. They grant permits to build
plants or additions to existing facilities.... They clear the papers that enable
an investor to acquire foreign currency in order to pay an exporter in some
other country for an air or sea shipment of raw materials or manufacturing
equipment.... They can accelerate or retard the receipt of cash needed for
the training of local workers. They can interpret an ancient law in ways that
will cripple the operations of the business; or, in their discretion, in ways that
facilitate operations. They can supply or withhold police or military units for
plant protection in remote parts of a country. They can help clarify misunder-
standings in the application of local labor, health, or sanitation codes.
Id.
47. Id. at 101-02; KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at 19-20.
48. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 102.
49. Id. at 110-11.
50. Id. at 112-13; KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at 20.
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taining business with the government in question. 51 Upper-level
government actors exercise substantial control over these areas
of concern, giving these government actors a correspondingly
substantial influence over commercial actors.5"
2. History of Governmental Corruption
Corrupt payments have occurred for centuries in some re-
gions. 3 The specific causes vary from case to case.54 But where
they occur, the participating government actors view their posi-
tions as resources for personal, familial, or tribal gain.55 Tradi-
tions of strong governmental control56 or histories of weak cen-
tral control,57 the latter often coupled with a tradition of strong
loyalties to family or tribe, can often produce corruption of gov-
ernment actors. 58  Many corruption-ridden nations also suffer
from a combination of a high degree of public officials' discre-
tionary prwer over private commercial activities and a low level
of compensation paid to those officials, making them particu-
larly susceptible to the temptations of corruption.59 Finally,
51. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 114-15.
52. Id.
53. See 2 FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD
IN THE AGE OF PHILIP II 693 (1973) (describing prevalence of corruption in Ottoman
Empire in sixteenth century); JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 7, 254 n.5 (describing
history of corruption in Middle East); NOONAN, supra note 3, at 3-135 (discussing occur-
rence of bribery in European and Mediterranean societies from 3000 B.C. to 1000
A.D.). The Middle East has seen corrupt conduct by state officials since the sixteenth
century and the days of the Ottoman Empire. BRAUDEL, supra, at 693; JACOBY ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 7, 254 n.5. Southeast Asia likewise has a long history of corruption,
stemming from its equally well-established smuggling trade. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3,
at 15-16.
54. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 7-11, 24-25.
55. Id.; NOONAN, supra note 3, at 704.
56. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 7. In the Middle East, for example, states were
traditionally "the major source[s] and owner[s] of capital... the primary dispenser[s]
of contracts, and the arbiter[s] of the rules of trade and investment." Id.
57. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 10, 24.
58. Id. Sub-Saharan societies, for example, suffer from internal divisions of loyalty
along tribal lines. Id. at 10. Similarly, strong ties to family are characteristic of Latin
American and Southeast Asian societies. Id. at 24. In such internally divided environ-
ments, the local government, and the positions of influence it offers, is a resource one
may exploit for one's personal, tribal, and familial benefit. Id. at 10, 24.
59. Id. at 14; KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at 74; 3 GUNNARa MYRDAL, AsIAN DRAMA: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF NATIONS 950-51 (1968). As Robert Klitgaard has noted,
"[i]llicit activities will be greater when agents have monopoly power over clients, agents
enjoy discretion, and accountability is poor." KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at 74. India in
the late 1970s saw a high prevalence of corruption among its public officials, resulting
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while the prevalence of corruption within a government tends to
decline as the nation in question develops socioeconomically,6 °
corruption does not necessarily cease to exist at any given level
of development. 6' One may even find not-too-distant examples
of corruption in 1970s Western Europe 62 and the United
from a high degree of discretionary power among its public officials coupled with a low
level of compensation paid to those officials. See JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 14
(citing HINDUSTAN TIMES correspondent who stated, "[n]ot a single file can move if the
clerk's palm is not greased.").
60. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 43. Corrupt payments by business organizations
to government actors are likely to decrease in frequency as the following socioeconomic
developments occur:
The shifting of loyalties from family, clan, and tribe to nation-states.
The opening of institutionalized channels to enable business enterprise
to influence political decision making.
The diffusion of education.
The emergence of an economically strong and politically articulate mid-
dle class, which historically found corruption inefficient and morally repug-
nant.
The transfer of wealth and power from a small circle of politicians or
dictators to other social groups.
Rising living standards.
The growth of local industry, which will reduce the importance of contra-
band markets.
The paying of adequate salaries to civil servants, thereby reducing their
dependance on a private system of [corrupt] political payments.
The development of strong, independent legal traditions in which uni-
form, impersonal rules and standards prevail instead of the arbitrary discre-
tion of the civil servants.
The growth of the professions-accounting, law, engineering, teaching,
civil service-which infuse their members and eventually, widening circles of
society, with strict canons of personal behavior.
Id. at 43-44; cf. KLITCAARD, supra note 3, at 207 (stating that "the countries worst off on
indices of 'quality of life' are.., also the worst off in terms of the quantity and quality of
data, information-processing skills, 'intelligence' in the psychologist's sense, and, conse-
quently, ignorance and uncertainty" and that "[p]oor information leads... to greater
corruption").
61. JACOBY ET A.., supra note 3, at 43.
62. Id. at 32-38. In two separate cases in 1976, Belgian authorities convicted the
managing director of Belgium's state telephone system for corruption and receiving
bribes, his sentences amounting to over four and a half years in prison. Id. at 32-33;
Belgium Ex-Aid Sentenced to Jail in Bribery Case: Telephone System's Former Director Took
Presents from HT Belgian Unit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1976, at 4. A British Government
investigation in 1976 into the actions of the British Lonrho company revealed that it
had made over $1.6 million in illicit payments to politicians in several undisclosed Afri-
can states. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 33-34; Bernard. D. Nossiter, British Glimpse
Goings-On at the Top in Juicy Government Report on Lonrho, LA TIMFS, July 25, 1976, pt.
VII, at 9. In Italy in the mid 1970s, the tradition of facilitating payments as a method of
navigating the massive Italian bureaucracy combined with the discretion which Italian
tax collectors possessed in the application of tax laws and regulations to create an arena
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States.63
B. Harmful Effects of Corruption
While individual actors may benefit from the transfer of cor-
rupt payments,6 4 the ultimate victims are numerous.6  The vic-
tims of corruption include the market actors of the nations in-
volved, both consumers and producers.66 The development of
the economy in question also suffers, with investments from
outside sources decreasing in frequency and amount as corrup-
tion increases in prevalence. 67 Corruption can also lead to polit-
ical instability.68
which forced corporations to pay bribes in order to avoid unjustifiedly high taxes.
JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 35-38; see Italy Renews Its War on Tax Evaders: Country's
Economic Health Riding on Success of Campaign, LA TIMES, Dec. 16, 1976, pt. VIII, at 4
(stating that "[s]ome Milan businessmen have said that they pay so much in bribes that
there seems little reason to pay the right amount of taxes"). Italian corruption still
manifests itself, as the mani pulite, or clean hands, campaign to root out corruption
continues to demonstrate. George J. Church, War Against Sleaze, TIME INT'L, May 6,
1996, at 34, 37. The individuals exposed through this campaign number over 1000 and
include the former Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, who received an eight-year prison
sentence in April of 1996 for corruption in connection with the construction of the
Milan subway system. Id. at 39.
63. SeeJAcoBy ET AL., supra note 3, at 41-43 (citing examples of corruption in inter-
business transactions and suggesting investigation into whether corrupt payments occur
between U.S. Government functionaries and foreign business entities domiciled in
United States); NOONAN, supra note 3, at 604-611 (discussing Abscam, one U.S. govern-
ment sting operation that revealed that federal, state, and local government officials
had taken bribes, some as high as US$50,000). During the 1970s, U.S. corporations
were also the source of a great number of corrupt payments to government actors in
other countries. MARSHALL B. CLINARD ET AL., ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 198
(1979). By August of 1976, in response to regulations then in force, 32 of Fortune
Magazine's 500 largest corporations had made disclosures to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission of such payments of over US$1 million each. Id. Four reported
payments of US$20 million or more. Id.
64. See KLrrGAARD, supra note 3, at 191 (stating that "[o]ften corruption helps one
party at the expense of another"); see also supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text
(discussing why corrupt payments occur).
65. SeeJAcoBv ET AL., supra note 3, at 142, 183-84 (discussing corruption's harm to
producers and consumers); KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at 39-44 (discussing harmful ef-
fects of corruption on market participants).
66. JAcov ET AL., supra note 3, at 142, 183-84; KLrrGAARD, supra note 3, at 39-44.
67. See Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681, 681-712 (1995)
(discussing statistical correlations between corruption, investment, and economic
growth); see also KLrrcTAARD, supra note 3, at 43-44 (discussing how corruption induces
producers to cease production in corrupt market).
68. KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at 44-46.
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1. Harmful Economic Effects of Corruption
Transactional barriers play a harmful role in the interna-
tional market, imposing additional costs on market actors and
discouraging transactions from occurring.69 By forcing produ-
cers and consumers to pay higher costs in order to engage in the
transaction, corruption functions as a transactional barrier.7 ° As
such, corruption imposes additional costs on market actors with
the effect of deterring market exchanges from ever taking
place.71
a. Transactional Barriers in the Marketplace
Market actors do not always have the liberty of freely partici-
pating in market exchanges.7 2 At times, they must make invol-
untary payments prior to entering into a given transaction.73
These additional costs have the effect of discouraging the trans-
actions to which the costs are associated, preventing their occur-
rence.7 ' Any involuntary payment that a producer must make
prior to participating in a market is a payment that acts as a bar-
rier to market exchanges, discouraging them from taking
place. 75 Barriers to exchange can also discourage potential par-
ticipants from entering the market in question, thereby protect-
ing existing suppliers from additional competition. 76 These bar-
riers can cause substantial harm77 by leading to a decrease in the
incentive to innovate and to a general stagnation among existing
producers.7 8
69. Rothbard, supra note 19, at 637-38.
70. SeeJAcoBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 142, 183-84 (discussing harm corruption
inflicts on producers and consumers).
71. Id.
72. Rothbard, supra note 19, at 637-38.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 638.
75. Id.
76. Robert Hessen, Capitalism, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS,
supra note 19, at 110, 113-14.
77. Douglas A. Irwin, Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions, in THE FORTUNE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, supra note 19, at 530. Tariffs, for example, by relieving




b. Corruption as a Source of Transactional Barriers
Corruption imposes additional costs on consumers and pro-
ducers alike. 79 Consumers, the citizens of the purchasing gov-
ernment, pay these costs through the use of public resources be-
yond that which is necessary for the purchase of the good."° Pro-
ducers measure the cost to themselves in the amount of the
payment itself as well as in the time necessary for negotiating the
amount of the payment. 81 The consumers of a corruptly-ac-
quired good or service pay a higher cost than they would have
paid in a market without these unsanctioned barriers to trade.82
This cost may take the form of resources wasted on goods or
services purchased not because of a rational cost-benefit analy-
sis8" on the citizens' part or on their behalf, but rather because
of personal inducements given to their agent, the government
actor.84 The citizens may also suffer as a result of subsequent
damage inflicted on life, limb, or property by the inferior prod-
ucts.85 Harm flows to producers as well through the persistence
of corrupt transactions.8 6 The uncertainty that producers face
regarding the amount they must pay and the payment's poten-
tial effect on a given transaction, the added time and expense
producers face in negotiating with the recipients of the payment,
and the expenditure of an otherwise-unnecessary payment are
all additional transaction costs which act as barriers to any invest-
79. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 142, 183-84.
80. Id. at 184-85.
81. Id. at 142.
82. SeeJAcoBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 183 (stating that "the price of the [corruptly
acquired] equipment is raised [by the producer] to cover the cost of the bribe").
83. See Paul R. Pormey, Benefit-Cost Analysis, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EC-
ONOMICS, supra note 19, 3-6 (explaining cost-benefit analyses). A cost-benefit analysis
occurs "[w]henever people decide whether the advantages of a particular action are
likely to outweigh its drawbacks." Id. at 3.
84. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 183-84; see KLrrcAARD, supra note 3, at 39-40
(stating that corruption imposes costs "in terms of the waste and misallocation that
often accompany it", citing "a typical finding... that because of corrupt procurement
policies, governments in developing countries pay from 20 to 100 percent more than
the price they would pay under noncorrupt conditions").
85. See JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 183 (noting "extra costs" associated with
corruptly acquired goods stemming from "lesser efficiency"); KLrrcAARD, supra note 3,
at 40 (noting harm to public that can result from corruption).
86. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 142; see KuTGAARD, supra note 3, at 42-43 (stating
that existence of corruption "may enhance people's uncertainties about the likely bene-
fits of their productive activities" which, in turn, "may create incentives for inefficient
risk-avoiding behavior").
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2. Harmful Political Effects of Corruption
Corrupt transactions may also result in the political instabil-
ity of the host state.8" The mere existence of corruption among
government actors engenders mistrust of public institutions, de-
stabilizing the political regime."9 Corruption's harmful eco-
nomic effects may further upset a state's political stability by hin-
dering local infrastructure development and, therefore, the
functioning of the state itself.90 Corruption hinders local infra-
structure development by discouraging producers from investing
in those markets.91 This initial lack of investment further dis-
courages producers from investing locally.92 As producers move
their resources from these local markets to areas in which they
may produce more efficiently,9 they also move further away
87. JACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 142; KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at 42-43.
88. Wolfgang Kasper, Spatial Economics, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Eco-
NOMICS, supra note 19, at 82-86; KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at 43-46; Nancy Z. Boswell,
Combating Corruption: Focus on Latin America, 3 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 179, 184-85 (1996).
89. KLITGAARD, supra note 3, at 44-46; Boswell, supra note 88, at 184-85. Corrup-
tion erodes "public trust in public institutions and leaders, the foundation of democ-
racy." Id. at 184.
90. Kasper, supra note 88, at 82-86; KLrrcAARD, supra note 3, at 43-44.
91. See Kasper, supra note 88, at 82-86 (describing movement of mobile resources
to areas in which market actors may use them more efficiently); KLITGAARD, supra note
3, at 43-44. The theory of spatial economics divides production input factors into mo-
bile and immobile elements. Kasper, supra note 88, at 83. The theory holds that mo-
bile factors of production, such as capital and expertise, will locate themselves close to
the world's economic centers, areas in which it is possible to achieve higher returns per
unit of input than elsewhere. Id. at 83-84. As corruption's barriers to trade increase the
cost of transacting between the corrupt nation in question and an economic center, this
increases the economic distance of the corrupt nation from the economic center, lead-
ing to an exodus of private-sector resources from the corrupt nation, which in turn
leads to a necessarily adverse effect on infrastructure. See id. (discussing gravitation of
resources to economic centers); Clive Crook, Third World Economic Development, in THE
FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, supra note 19, 755, 763 (stating that private
businesses are most effective entities for developing infrastructure, such as transporta-
tion networks and educational institutions). Empirical analyses also indicate that there
is an inverse correlation between the prevalence of corruption and the frequency and
amount of investment. See Mauro, supra note 67, at 695-700 (discussing how invest-
ments from outside sources decrease in frequency and amount as corruption increases
in prevalence).
92. Kasper, supra note 88, at 84. Without a well-developed infrastructure, produ-
cers will bear high costs in producing their products and getting them to a market
which will give them the highest return on their investment. Id. These increased pro-
duction and distribution costs lead producers and mobile factors of production to lo-
cate in areas where the cost of reaching the economic center is minimized. Id.
93. Id. at 82. "Businesses locate their plants so as to economize on transport and
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from markets neighboring the abandoned market. 94 This is
more likely to occur if neighboring markets are also corrupt.95
C. International Organizations with Recent Proposals for Combating
Corruption
In the past three years, two prominent international organi-
zations, the OAS and the OECD, have offered solutions to the
problems corruption poses.96 Each organization holds the pro-
motion of economic development as a primary objective.97 Each
is also committed to collective action to achieve this end.98
1. The Organization of American States
The OAS has organized itself with a view to promoting co-
communication costs... between the locations of their inputs and the locations of their
market demand." Id.
94. See id. at 84 (discussing how mobile factors of production locate in certain
areas so as to minimize cost of reaching economic center).
95. Id. at 84.
96. Convention, supra note 10; Bribery Recommendation, supra note 12; Tax Recom-
mendation, supra note 12.
97. OAS CHARTER art 2 1 f; OECD CHARTER art. 1. Article two, paragraph f, of the
OAS Charter lists "[t]o promote, by cooperative action .... [members'] economic,
social, and cultural development" as an essential purpose of the OAS. OAS CHARTER
art. 2 f. Article 1 of the OECD Charter states that
The aims of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
... shall be to promote policies designed:
(a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and
a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial
stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy;
(b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-
member countries in the process of economic development; and
(c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multi-lateral, non-dis-
criminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.
OECD CHARTER art. 1.
98. OAS CHARTER art. 2 f; OECD CHARTER art. 3. Article 2, paragraph f, of the
OAS Charter advocates the promotion of economic development "by cooperative ac-
tion". OAS CHARTER art. 2 f. Article 3 of the OECD Charter states that OECD mem-
bers agree to:
(a) [K]eep each other informed and furnish the Organisation with the infor-
mation necessary for the accomplishment of its tasks;
(b) consult together on a continuing basis, carry out studies and participate in
agreed projects; and
(c) co-operate closely and where appropriate take co-ordinated action.
OECD CHARTER art. 3.
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operation among its members. 99 It has also dedicated itself to
the furtherance of specific principles.'0 0 Among the most prom-
inent of these principles are those of non-intervention' 01 and
collective economic development.10 2
a. Organization
The OAS is a regional organization serving Western Hemi-
sphere states.10 3  The nations of North and South America
formed the OAS in 1951 as a regional agency within the United
Nations' 014 under Article 52 of the U.N. Charter.' 015 The OAS is
comprised exclusively of Western Hemisphere independent
states' 0 6 and currently has thirty-four participating members.'07
The OAS accomplishes its purposes through the General Assem-
99. OAS CHARTER art. 2 f.
100. Id. art. 2.
101. Id. art. 2 b. Article 2, paragraph b, lists as an essential purpose the promo-
tion and consolidation of representative democracy "with due respect for the principle
of nonintervention". Id.
102. Id. art. 2 f.
103. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 583 (2d ed.
1995).
104. OAS CHARTER art. 1. The Charter was opened for signature in 1948 and en-
tered into force in 1951 pursuant to its provisions on ratification and entry into force.
Id. arts. 144-45; CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 103, at 583. The OAS formed in order to
allow Western Hemisphere nations collectively to pursue socioeconomic development
and regional security. OAS CHARTER art. 2; CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra, at 583.
105. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, 1-4. Article 52 states:
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional ar-
rangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the mainte-
nance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional ac-
tion provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are con-
sistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements
or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settle-
ment of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such re-
gional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settle-
ment of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such re-
gional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference
from the Security Council.
4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.
Id. Articles 34 and 35 govern the general pacific settlement of disputes among U.N.
members. Id. arts. 34-35.
106. OAS CHARTER art. 8.
107. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 103, at 583; Organization of American States,
Member States, (visited on 2/19/97) <http://www.oas.org/EN/MSTATES/bckgrdme.
htm> (also on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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bly,' °8 the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Af-
fairs,10 9 the Permanent Council,"' the Inter-American Council
for Integral Development,1 ' the Inter-American Council for Ed-
108. OAS CHARTER arts. 53-59. The General Assembly is the supreme organ of the
OAS. Id. art. 53. Article 53 provides that the General Assembly possesses the power:
a) To decide the general action and policy of the Organization, deter-
mine the structure and functions of its organs, and consider any matter relat-
ing to friendly relations among the American States;
b) To establish measures for coordinating the activities of the organs,
agencies, and entities of the Organization among themselves, and such activi-
ties with those of the other institutions of the inter-American system;
c) To strengthen and coordinate cooperation with the United Nations
and its specialized agencies;
d) To promote collaboration, especially in the economic, social, and cul-
tural fields, with other international organizations whose purposes are similar
to those of the Organization of American States.
Id. art. 53 11 a-d.
109. Id. arts. 60-68. Article 60 states that the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs "shall be held in order to consider problems of an urgent nature and
of common interest to the American States, and to serve as the Organ of Consultation."
Id. art. 60.
110. Id. arts. 79-91. The OAS Charter provides that the Permanent Council "shall
keep vigilance over the maintenance of friendly relations among the Member States,
and for that purpose shall effectively assist them in the peaceful settlement of their
disputes". Id. art. 83. The Permanent Council is "directly responsible to the General
Assembly" and derives its authority from "the [OAS] Charter and other inter-American
instruments". Id. art. 69, amended by Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the
OAS,June 10, 1993 [hereinafter Protocol of Managua], reprinted in Integrated Text, supra
note 28, at 1011. The Permanent Council is also responsible for performing functions
"assigned to it by the General Assembly and the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs." Id. As the OAS Charter states:
The Permanent Council of the Organization and the Inter-American Council
for Integral Development are directly responsible to the General Assembly,
and each has the authority granted to it in the Charter and other inter-Ameri-
can instruments, as well as the functions assigned to it by the General Assem-
bly and the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
Id.
111. Id. arts. 92-97, amended by Protocol of Managua, supra note 110, at 1010-12.
The OAS Charter states that the purpose of the Inter-American Council for Integral
Development is "to promote cooperation among the American States for the purpose
of achieving integral development and, in particular, helping to eliminate extreme pov-
erty, in accordance with the standards of the Charter, especially those set forth in Chap-
ter VII with respect to the economic, social, educational, cultural, scientific, and tech-
nological fields." Id. art. 93, amended by Protocol of Managua, supra note 110, at 1011.
The Inter-American Council for Integral Development is responsible for performing
functions that the General Assembly and the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs have assigned to it. Id. art. 69, amended by Protocol of Managua, supra
note 110, at 1011. The Inter-American Council for Integral Development derives its
authority from "the [OAS] Charter and other inter-American instruments" and is "di-
rectly responsible to the General Assembly." Id.
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ucation, Science, and Culture,'1 2 the Inter-American Juridical
Committee,' the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights," 4 the General Secretariat,'1 5 various Specialized Confer-
ences,1 1 6 and various Specialized Organizations.'
1 7
b. Goals
The OAS' goals, as manifested through the OAS Charter,
are primarily maintaining the territorial and political integrity of
its member-states"1 8 and collectively fostering regional socioeco-
112. Id. arts. 98-103. The OAS Charter provides that the purpose of the Inter-
American Council for Education, Science, and Culture is:
[T]o promote friendly relations and mutual understanding between the peo-
ples of the Americas through educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation
and exchange between Member States, in order to raise the cultural level of
the peoples, reaffirm their dignity as individuals, prepare them fully for the
tasks of progress, and strengthen the devotion to peace, democracy, and social
justice that has characterized their evolution.
Id. art. 99.
113. Id. arts. 104-110. The purpose of the Inter-American juridical Committee is:
[T]o serve the Organization as an advisory body on juridical matters; to pro-
mote the progressive development and the codification of international law;
and to study juridical problems related to the integration of the developing
countries of the Hemisphere and, insofar as may appear desirable, the possi-
bility of attaining uniformity in their legislation.
Id. art. 104.
114. Id. art. 111. The principal function of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights is "to promote the observance and protection of human rights and to
serve as a consultative organ of the Organization in these matters." Id.
115. Id. arts. 112-15, 117-21, 123-26; id. art. 116, amended by Protocol of Washing-
ton, supra note 28, at 1008; id., art. 122, amended by Protocol of Managua, supra note
110, at 1011. The OAS Charter provides that the General Secretariat:
[S]hall promote economic, social, juridical, educational, scientific, and cul-
tural relations among all the Member States of the Organization, with special
emphasis on cooperation for the elimination of extreme poverty, in keeping
with the actions and policies decided upon by the General Assembly and with
the pertinent decisions of the Councils.
OAS CHARTER art. 116, amended by Protocol of Washington, supra note 28, at 1008.
116. Id. art. 127-28. The OAS Charter states that the Specialized Conferences are:
intergovernmental meetings to deal with special technical matters or to develop specific
aspects of inter-American cooperation. They shall be held when either the General
Assembly or the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs so decides, on
its own initiative or at the request of one of the Councils or Specialized Organizations.
Id. art. 127.
117. Id. arts. 112-29. The OAS charter provides that the Inter-American Special-
ized Organizations "are the intergovernmental organizations established by multilateral
agreements and having specific functions with respect to technical matters of common
interest to the American States." Id. art. 129.
118. Id. arts. 2, 3, 27-28. Articles 2, 3, 27, and 28 list the strengthening of peace
and security and respecting the principle of non-intervention as among the OAS's es-
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nomic development." 9 Maintaining and respecting the inde-
pendence of OAS members is a recurring tenet of the OAS
Charter. 20 The OAS Charter, however, repeatedly requires ex-
tensive collective action in the area of economic development. 2 1
As a regional agent of the United Nations, the OAS must ensure
sential purposes, proclaiming non-intervention as a principle to which its members ad-
here, prohibiting acts of aggression by members against other members, and pledging
collective opposition to such acts. Id. The OAS's actions following the September 1991
coup in Haiti are a recent example of the OAS's commitment to maintaining the polit-
ical integrity of its members. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 103, at 584. In the month
following the coup, the OAS denounced the overthrow of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the
democratically elected president, and imposed a trade embargo. Ad Hoc Meeting of Min-
isters of Foreign Affairs: Support to the Democratic Movement of Haiti, M.R.E. Res. 1/91,
OAS. M.R.E., O.EA./Ser.F/V.1 (1991); CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 103, at 584.
When the OAS perceived that the Haitian military leader was not complying with the
July 1993 Governor's Island Agreement between himself and Aristide, the OAS re-
sponded in June of 1994 by banning all commercial flights and financial transactions to
and from Haiti. Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Call for the Return to Democ-
racy in Haiti, M.R.E. Res. 6/94, OAS. M.R.E., O.EA/Ser.F/V.1 (1994); CARTER &
TRIMBLE, supra note 103, at 584. Some critics note that the OAS had difficulty in ensur-
ing compliance with these resolutions and had attempted unsuccessfully to enforce sim-
ilar sanctions on four previous occasions. Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs:
Support for Democracy in Haiti, M.R.E. Res. 2/91, OAS. M.R.E., O.E.A./Ser.F/V.1
(1991); Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Restoration of Democracy in Haiti,
M.R.E. Res. 3/92, O.A.S. M.R.E., O.E.A./Ser.F/V.1 (1992); Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs: Reinstatement of Democracy in Haiti, M.R.E. Res. 4/92, OAS. M.R.E.,
O.E.A./Ser.F/V.1 (1992); Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Support for the
Haitian People, M.R.E. Res. 5/93, OAS. M.R.E., O.E.A./Ser.F/V.1 (1993); CARTER &
TRIMBLE, supra note 103, at 584.
119. See OAS CHARTER arts. 29-32, 34-51 (detailing collective measures member-
states pledge to take toward integral development); id. arts. 2, 3, 33, amended by Protocol
of Washington, supra note 28, at 1006-08 (listing cooperative promotion of member-
states' economic, cultural, and social development as among OAS's essential purposes,
proclaiming economic cooperation as a principle to which its member states adhere,
and listing measures to take toward integral development); id. arts. 92-97 amended by
Protocol of Managua, supra note 110, at 1009-12 (establishing an Inter-American Coun-
cil for Integral Development). The OAS General Assembly reaffirmed its commitments
to integrated development in June of 1995, calling for programs assisting members in
identifying potential areas of cooperation and in implementing cooperative projects,
for the encouragement of participation by educational and research institutions in
human resource training and development, and for the development of a strategy for
mobilizing additional developmental financial resources which provides for the partici-
pation of members as well as developmental agencies and financial institutions. Partner-
ship for Development and Struggle to Overcome Extreme Poverty, A.G. Res. 1354, O.A.S. A.G.,
XXV-O/95 (1995).
120. OAS CHARTER arts. 16, 18, 27-28; id. arts. 2, 3, amended by Protocol of Washing-
ton, supra note 28, at 1006-07.
121. Id. arts. 29-32, 34-51; id. arts. 2, 3, 33, amended by Protocol of Washington,
supra note 28, at 1006-08; id. arts. 92-97, amended by Protocol of Managua, supra note
110, at 1009-12.
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that its actions are consistent with the United Nations' purposes
and principles. 12 2 One of the United Nations' principles is that
of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states.
123
Although this provision is already binding on the OAS members,
given their independent status as U.N. members, the provision
also appears throughout the OAS Charter, 124 including in its
preamble.1 2 5 In listing the promotion and consolidation of rep-
resentative democracy as an essential purpose of the OAS, the
OAS Charter states that its members should accomplish this pur-
pose with respect for the principle of non-intervention.1
26
The OAS Charter also enumerates several principles related
to non-intervention that it seeks to affirm. 127 It establishes that
respect for the personality, sovereignty, and independence of
states is central to international order.128  It also declares that
each state possesses the right to organize its own social, political,
122. U.N. CHARTER art. 52 1 1. Article 52 allows for the formation of regional
agencies, "provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consis-
tent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." Id. This caveat does not
prevent a regional agency from providing more stringent restrictions on members' ac-
tions than those contained in the U.N. Charter. Id. See Hugo Caminos et al., The OAS
Charter After Forty Years, 82 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PRoc. 101, 102-03 (1988) (discussing how
OAS Charter's non-intervention provisions are more restrictive than U.N. Charter's).
As one commentator notes, the OAS Charter's provisions regarding non-intervention
make the U.N. Charter's corresponding provisions "seem modest and restrained in con-
trast." Caminos et al., supra, at 102.
123. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2 1 7 (stating that no member state may "intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state"). The Inter-
national Court ofJustice discussed the extent of states' individual jurisdictions and how
the principle of non-intervention affects these jurisdictions in Case ConcerningMilitaiy &
Paramilitary Activities In & Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27, 1986). The Court stated that, although the U.N. Charter does not
define the principle of non-intervention, this principle is "part and parcel of customary
international law." Id. at 106. As to states' individual jurisdictions, the Court held that
the principle of non-intervention prevents states from intervening in "matters in which
[other] State[s] [are] permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely."
Id. at 108. Although the Court did not enumerate all matters on which states may
decide freely, it did state that one such matter is "the choice of a political, economic,
social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy." Id.
124. OAS CHARTER arts. 16, 18, 27-28; OAS CHARTER arts. 2, 3, amended by Protocol
of Washington, supra note 28, at 1006-07.
125. See OAS CHARTER pmbl. ("Resolved to persevere in the noble undertaking
that humanity has conferred upon the United Nations, whose principles and purposes
they solemnly reaffirm").
126. Id. art. 2 1 b.
127. Id. art. 3 11 b, e, arts. 16, 18-21.
128. Id. art. 3 1 b. In article 3, paragraph b, the OAS reaffirms the principle that
"([i]nternational order consists essentially of respect for the personality, sovereignty,
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and economic affairs and that each state must also refrain from
interfering in the affairs of other states.129 It treats non-interven-
tion as bound to other fundamental rights and duties as well,
such as the right of a state to develop its cultural, political, and
economic life.' 30
The OAS Charter also contains several explicit prohibitions
on intervention and the use of force.' 3 1 It explicitly denies any
member the right to intervene in any way, for any reason, in any
other state's internal or external affairs. 1 2 By its terms, this pro-
hibition applies to any interference or attempted interference
against a state's political, economic, or cultural elements. 3 The
and independence of States, and the faithful fulfilment of obligations derived from
treaties and other sources of international law." Id.
129. Id. art. 3 e. In article 3, paragraph e, the OAS reaffirms the principle that
"[e]very state has the right to chose, without external interference, its political, eco-
nomic, and social system and to organize itself in the way best suited to it, and has the
duty to abstain from intervening in the affairs of another State." Id. Paragraph e fur-
ther holds that, subject to that principle, "the American States shall cooperate fully
among themselves, independently of the nature of their political, economic, and social
systems." Id. The International Court ofJustice has held that this principle is also a
fundamental principle of customary international law and, thus, applies to all states,
even if it did not appear in any separate international agreement. Nicaragua v. United
States of America, 1986 I.CJ. at 106. The Court also noted, however, that "examples of
trespass against this principle are not infrequent". Id.
130. OAS CHARTER art. 16. Article 16 lists as a fundamental right of each member
the right "to develop its cultural, political, and economic life freely and naturally." Id.
Article 16 further states that, "[i]n this free development, the State shall respect the
rights of the individual and the principles of universal morality." Id.
131. Id. arts. 18-21. On the other hand, at least one critic has noted that the senti-
ments of these prohibitions "have far out run the capacities of the OAS to manage the
real world conflicts among states within the hemisphere." Caminos et al., supra note
122, at 108. As one scholar commented:
Witness the U.S. effort in Guatemala in 1954; Venezuelan and Panamanian
material aid to the anti-Somoza forces in Nicaragua in the 1970s; the Ameri-
can invasion of Grenada; and the admitted Sandinista support for the anti-
government guerrillas in El Salvador in the 1980s. The intractable conflict of
our age is Central America. Yet, in spite of articles 18 through 21 of the 1948
Charter, the OAS has been essentially irrelevant to the Central American con-
flicts. It has not become, in the 40 years of its history under the Charter, a
viable means of resolving conflicts involving the use of force in the Americas.
Id.
132. OAS CHARTER art. 18. Article 18 states that "[nlo State or any group of States
has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal
or external affairs of any other State." Id.
133. Id. Article 18 declares that the prohibition on interference in a state's inter-
nal or external affairs applies "not only [to] armed force but also [to] any other form of
interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its polit-
ical, economic and cultural elements." Id.
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OAS Charter further prohibits the use of economically or politi-
cally coercive measures as a means to force a state's will in ob-
taining an advantage for that state. 134 It also forbids the military
occupation of any state by another 3 and declares that the mem-
bers of the OAS will use force only in self-defense and in accord-
ance with existing treaties.1
3 6
Despite a strict policy of non-intervention, the U.N. Charter
permits and encourages international regional cooperation in
economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian matters.1 37 Inter-
national regional cooperation is one of the overriding aims of
the OAS Charter.3 8  International cooperation features in the
OAS Charter's preamble. t 39 The OAS Charter lists the promo-
tion of cooperation among its members, specifically cooperation
relating to socioeconomic development, as one of its essential
134. Id. art. 19. Article 19 forbids any member to "use or encourage the use of
coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign
will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind." Id.
135. Id. art. 20. Article 20 establishes that:
The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily,
of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State,
directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or
special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion
shall be recognized.
Id.
136. Id. art. 21. Article 21 states that the members of the OAS "bind themselves in
their international relations not to have recourse to the use of force, except in the case
of self-defense in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof." Id. At
least one invocation of this exception has proved controversial. CARTER & TRIMBLE,
supra note 103, at 1420. Some question whether the OAS recommendation of action
against Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis complied with U.N. Charter provisions re-
garding advisement of the Security Council. Id.
137. U.N. CHARTER art. 52 1; see U.N. CHARTER art. 1 3 (stating that one pur-
pose of United Nations is "[t]o achieve international co-operation in solving interna-
tional problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character"). Despite
the prominence which the U.N. Charter gives to cooperative efforts, the importance of
maintaining the principle of non-intervention supercedes the importance of coopera-
tive efforts. See OAS CHARTER art. 3 e (noting that command to members to "cooper-
ate fully among themselves" is itself subject to "the duty to abstain from interfering in
the affairs of another State"). See also id. art. 30 (stating that "cooperation for integral
development ... should . . .respect the priorities established by each country in its
developmental plans"); cf. id. art. 34 (forbidding members to adopt measures
that adversely affect development of other states).
138. OAS CHARTER pmbl., art. 2 e, f, art. 3 e, arts. 29-32, 34-51; id. art. 3 k,
art. 33, amended by Protocol of Washington, supra note 28, at 1007-08.
139. See id. pmbl. (stating that OAS members are "[p]ersuaded that their welfare
and their contribution to the progress and the civilization of the world will increasingly
require intensive continental cooperation").
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purposes.1 40  It also specifies the full cooperation among all
American states as an important principle.14 ' A recent amend-
ment to the OAS Charter also places specific emphasis on eco-
nomic cooperation among American states and establishes that
such cooperation is essential to the region's well-being and de-
velopment.1 42
Finally, the OAS Charter devotes an entire chapter to inte-
gral development.141 Chapter VII commands OAS members to
unite in their efforts to develop their economies, societies, cul-
tures, educational systems, and scientific and technological
fields, holding such development essential to peace and secur-
ity."4 Chapter VII also places specific emphasis on the need for
cooperating to further economic development by mandating co-
operation in the resolution of critical problems threatening the
economic development or stability of a particular nation, 145 the
development of improved conditions for trade in basic commod-
ities, 46 the development of measures designed to result in de-
140. See id. art. 2 1 f (declaring as an essential purpose "[to promote, by coopera-
tive action, their economic, social, and cultural development"); see also id. art. 2 e
(establishing search for "the solution of political, juridical, and economic problems that
may arise among them" as essential purpose).
141. Id. art. 3 1 e.
142. See id. art. 3 1 k, amended by Protocol of Washington, supra note 28, at 1007.
143. Id. arts. 29-32, 34-51; id. art. 33 amended by Protocol of Washington, supra note
28, at 1007-08. Article 29 defines integral development, stating that it "encompasses the
economic, social, educational, cultural, scientific, and technological fields through
which the goals that each country sets for accomplishing it should be achieved." Id. art.
29.
144. Id. arts. 29-32, 34-51; id. art. 33 amended by Protocol of Washington, supra note
28, at 1007-08.
145. Id. art. 36. Article 36 provides that "[t]he Member States agree to join to-
gether in seeking a solution to urgent or critical problems that may arise whenever the
economic development or stability of any Member State is seriously affected by condi-
tions that cannot be remedied through the efforts of that State." Id.
146. Id. art. 38 1 b(i). Article 38 declares that:
The Member States, recognizing the close interdependence between foreign
trade and economic and social development, should make individual and
united efforts to bring about the following: . . . b) Continuity in their eco-
nomic and social development by means of: i) Improved conditions for trade
in basic commodities through international agreements, where appropriate;
orderly marketing procedures that avoid the disruption of markets, and other
measures designed to promote the expansion of markets and to obtain de-
pendable incomes for producers, adequate and dependable supplies for con-
sumers, and stable prices that are both remunerative to producers and fair to
consumers.
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pendable incomes for suppliers and dependable supplies for
consumers, 47 and the development of conditions to promote
members' export earnings, especially among the developing na-
tions. 14 8
2. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
The OECD is an international association of states whose
common goal is to pursue worldwide economic growth and sta-
bility.149 All OECD members have pledged to achieve this goal
through collective measures.15 0 The primary source for imple-
menting these collective measures is the OECD Council.1 5 1
a. Organization
The OECD is an international organization whose member-
ship is not restricted by geographical location. 152 It formed in
1960 '1 and currently has twenty-nine members. 154 Its original
members were the members of the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation, 5' whose function was to administer
147. Id.
148. Id. art. 38 1 b(iv). Article 38 declares that:
The Member States, recognizing the close interdependence between foreign
trade and economic and social development, should make individual and
united efforts to bring about the following: . . . b) Continuity in their eco-
nomic and social development by means of: . . . iv) Conditions conducive to
increasing the real export earnings of the Member States, particularly the de-
veloping countries of the region, and to increasing their participation in inter-
national trade.
Id.
149. OECD CHARTER art. 1.
150. Id. art. 3.
151. Id. art. 7.
152. Cf id., pmbl. (stating that OECD members are convinced that cooperation to
extent broader than among United States, Canada, Turkey, and nations of Western
Europe "will make a vital contribution to peaceful harmonious relations among the
peoples of the world").
153. Id. pmbl.
154. Telephone interview with Mrs. K. Segerstrom, Information Officer, Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (Mar. 10, 1997); Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Member Countries (and date of joining)
(last modified on Oct. 31, 1996) <http://www.oecd.org/about/member-coun-
tries.htmi> (also on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
155. OECD CHARTER pmbl. In the Preamble to the OECD Charter, the original
OECD members recognize "that the economic recovery and progress of Europe to
which their participation in the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation has
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U.S. aid in reconstructing Europe after the Second World
War. 156 Representatives or Ministers from all OECD members
comprise the OECD Council, which is the source of all OECD
actions.15 7 Unless members agree unanimously in special cir-
cumstances, all OECD members must unanimously agree before
they may take any decisions binding on members or make any
recommendations to members. 58
b. Goals
The aims of the OECD are economic in nature. 159 The pur-
pose of these aims is to promote economic growth among OECD
members and non-members. 6 ' OECD members also agree to
pursue cooperative measures in accomplishing these aims.' 6'
Through the OECD Charter, OECD members agree to promote
policies whose purposes are to achieve a high level of economic
made a major contribution, have opened new perspectives for strengthening that tradi-
tion and applying it to new tasks and broader objectives." Id.
156. HENRY G. AUBREY, ATLANTIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION 9 (1967); Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, The OECD and Its Origins, (visited on
Mar. 9, 1997) <http://www.oecd.org/about/origins.htm> (also on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
157. OECD CHARTER art. 7. Article seven states that "[a] Council composed of all
the Members shall be the body from which all acts of the Organisation derive. The
Council may meet in sessions of Ministers or of Permanent Representatives." Id.
158. Id. arts. 5-6. Article 5 provides that the OECD may "(a) take decisions which,
except as otherwise provided, shall be binding on all the Members; (b) make recom-
mendations to Members; and (c) enter into agreements with Members, non-member
States and international organisations." Id. art. 5. Article 6 states that
1. Unless the Organisation otherwise agrees unanimously for special
cases, decisions shall be taken and recommendations shall be made by mutual
agreement of all the Members.
2. Each Member shall have one vote. If a Member abstains from voting
on a decision or recommendation, such abstention shall not invalidate the
decision or recommendation, which shall be applicable to the other Members
but not to the abstaining Member.
3. No decision shall be binding on any Member until it has complied with
the requirements of its own constitutional procedures. The other Members
may agree that such a decision shall apply provisionally to them.
Id. art. 6.
159. See id. art. 1 (stating that OECD's aims are to promote policies for achieving
"the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of
living, while maintaining financial stability," policies for contributing to "sound eco-
nomic expansion" in OECD and non OECD countries, and policies for contributing to
"the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis").
160. Id.
161. Id. art. 3.
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growth for OECD members, 16 2 to contribute to economic expan-
sion among OECD members and non-members alike, 6 ' and to
contribute to the general expansion of world trade." 4 In pursuit
of these aims, OECD members agree to promote effective use of
their resources, 1 5 pursue policies to encourage economic
growth and stability, 166 engage in efforts to reduce barriers to
trade and investment,1 67 and to contribute to the economic de-
velopment of both OECD members and non-members by en-
couraging the flow of capital.168 The OECD Charter also de-
clares that OECD members will use collective efforts to pursue
these aims, keeping each other informed as to their progress,169
consulting with one another,1 70 and taking joint action. 17 1
162. Id. art. 1 I a. Article 1, paragraph a, states that OECD members agree to
promote policies whose purpose is "to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth
and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintain-
ing financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world econ-
omy." Id.
163. Id. art. 1 b. Article 1, paragraph b, declares that OECD members agree to
promote policies that "contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as
non-member countries in the process of economic development." Id.
164. Id. art. 1 c. Article 1, paragraph c, expresses OECD members' commitment
to promote policies with the goal of contributing "to the expansion of world trade on a
multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations." Id.
165. Id. art. 2 a, b. Article 2, paragraphs a and b, state that OECD members
agree to "(a) promote the efficient use of their economic resources; [and] (b) in the
scientific and technological field, promote the development of their resources, en-
courage research and promote vocational training." Id.
166. Id. art. 2 c. Article 2, paragraph c states that OECD members agree that
they will "pursue policies designed to achieve economic growth and internal and exter-
nal financial stability and to avoid developments which might endanger their econo-
mies or those of other countries." Id.
167. Id. art. 2 d. Article 2, paragraph d states that OECD members agree that
they will "pursue their efforts to reduce or abolish obstacles to the exchange of goods
and services and current payments and maintain and extend the liberalisation of capital
movements." Id.
168. Id. art. 2 e. Article 2, paragraph e states that OECD members agree to
"contribute to the economic development of both Member and non-member countries
in the process of economic development by appropriate means and, in particular, by
the flow of capital to those countries, having regard to the importance to their econo-
mies of receiving technical assistance and of securing expanding export markets." Id.
169. Id. art. 3 a. Article 3, paragraph a, states that OECD members agree that
they will "keep each other informed and furnish the Organisation [sic] with the infor-
mation necessary for the accomplishment of its tasks." Id.
170. Id. art. 3 1 b. Article 3, paragraph b, states that OECD members agree to
"consult together on a continuing basis, carry out studies and participate in agreed
projects." Id.
171. Id. art. 3 c. Article 3, paragraph c, states that OECD members agree that
they will "co-operate closely and where appropriate take co-ordinated action." Id.
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II. PROPOSALS FOR COMBATING CORRUPTION
Several organizations and commentators have made propos-
als for combating corruption.1 72 Some of these proposals attack
corruption on a transnational level, which makes these ap-
proaches capable of directing efforts across state borders.1 7 3
Other proposals would attack corruption on a state level, focus-
ing on corruption's effects within a state. 7 4
A. Transnational Approaches
Several proposed solutions for combating corruption focus
on approaches that are not confined to any one state or its citi-
zens.1 75  The OAS has proposed one solution to corruption's
problems that involves coordination among governments. 176 An-
other example comes from the OECD that, like the Convention,
offers an approach to combating corruption that requires inter-
governmental cooperation. 77 Finally, at least one commentator
has suggested abandoning governments' role in combating cor-
ruption and entrusting the task to corporations who are better
equipped to determine the effects of corrective measures on
markets. 178
1. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
The OAS publicly recognized the need to combat corrup-
172. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m(b), 78m(d)(1), 78m(g), 78m(h), 78dd-1, 78dd-2,
78ff(a), 78ff(c) (1988) (criminalizing corrupt payments to foreign government offi-
cials); Convention, supra note 10 (proposing cooperative efforts among its members for
eradication of corruption in international business transactions); Bribery Recommenda-
tion, supra note 12 (proposing coordinated efforts among OECD members to combat
bribery in international business transactions); Tax Recommendation, supra note 12;
Baker, supra note 7, at 399-433 (discussing viability of corporate self-regulation as
method for controlling corruption); Geis & DiMento, supra note 11, at 72-86 (discuss-
ing prosecution of corporations versus prosecution of individuals for criminal viola-
tions); Levi, supra note 11, at 181-98 (discussing criminalization versus regulatory ap-
proaches to regulating corporate conduct).
173. Convention, supra note 10; Bribery Recommendation, supra note 12, at 1389-92;
Tax Recommendation, supra note 12, at 1311-12; Baker, supra note 7, at 399-433.
174. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m(b), 78m(d)(1), 78m(g), 78m(h), 78dd-1, 78dd-2,
78ff(a), 78ff(c) (1988); Geis & DiMento, supra note 11, at 72-86; Levi, supra note 11, at
181-98.
175. Convention, supra note 10; Bribery Recommendation, supra note 12; Tax Recom-
mendation, supra note 12; Baker, supra note 7, at 399-433.
176. Convention, supra note 10.
177. Bribery Recommendation, supra note 12; Tax Recommendation, supra note 12.
178. Baker, supra note 7, at 399-433.
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tion on December 11, 1994 at the Summit of the Americas in
Miami, Florida.179 Finding that corruption of government offi-
cials posed a direct threat to its aims, the OAS expressed its in-
tent to take action against corruption in a document entitled
Summit of the Americas Declaration of Principles ("Summit
Declaration"). 80 In the Summit Declaration, the OAS reaf-
firmed its adherence to the principles of international law and
the principles and purposes that both itself and the United Na-
tions espouse.181 The Summit Declaration lists non-intervention
among these principles1 8 2 and reiterates the conviction that the
OAS may advance these principles through coordinated ef-
forts. 8 The Summit Declaration also specifically addresses cor-
ruption as a factor affecting the principles and convictions of the
OAS,184 declaring that corruption is a factor of social disintegra-
tion that distorts markets and undermines governments' legiti-
macy.1 85
In an accompanying document entitled Summit of the
Americas Plan of Action ("Summit Plan of Action"),"86 the OAS
sets forth a separate series of proposals devoted to attacking cor-
ruption. 87 The Summit Plan of Action suggests establishing
179. Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, 34
I.L.M. 808, 808-38 (1994) [hereinafter Summit Declaration & Plan]. At the Summit of
the Americas, "[t ]he elected heads of state and government of the Americas" gathered
to express their commitment "to advance the prosperity, democratic values and institu-
tions, and security" of the hemisphere. Id. at 810.
180. Id. at 810-14.
181. Id. at 810. At the 1994 Summit of the Americas, participants reiterated their
"firm adherence to the principles of international law and the purposes and principles
enshrined in the United Nations Charter and in the Charter of the Organization of
American States." Id.
182. Id. at 810. In Summit of the Americas Declaration of Principles ("Summit
Declaration"), the OAS reaffirms "the principles of the sovereign equality of states, non-
intervention, self-determination, and the peaceful resolution of disputes." Id.
183. Id. The Summit Declaration states that the OAS recognizes "the heterogene-
ity and diversity of our resources and cultures, just as we are convinced that we can
advance our shared interests and values by building strong partnerships." Id.
184. Id. at 811.
185. Id.; see id. at 818 (stating that "[c]orruption in both the public and private
sectors weakens democracy and undermines the legitimacy of governments and institu-
tions").
186. Id. at 815-35. The Summit of the Americas Plan of Action ("Summit Plan of
Action") is a statement of the OAS's intent to adopt the measures which it outlines. Id.
at 815.
187. Id. at 818-19. Although the Summit Plan of Action does not specifically detail
how to achieve the anti-corruption measures it advocates, the Appendix to it does state
that the OAS, as well as public and private sector partnerships, play important roles in
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general transparency of public administration""' and developing
priorities for achieving such transparency. 189 It also calls for
measures regarding public employees by advocating that states
ensure proper oversight of governmental functions, 190 that states
establish standards for addressing conflicts of interest among
public employees,' 9 ' and that states establish standards for ad-
dressing illicit enrichment of public employees.192 It also pro-
poses strengthening government regulations and the administra-
tion of justice. 9 ' Finally, the Summit Plan of Action proposes
several cooperative measures that promote the adoption of simi-
lar measures by other non-Western Hemisphere states with citi-
zens transacting in the Western Hemisphere,194 the develop-
ment of a liaison with the OECD,' 95 the development of meth-
ods of cooperation to enable rapid investigations, 196 and the
connection with combating corruption. Id. at 818-19, 835-36, 838. The Appendix also
states that the Summit Plan of Action envisages roles for the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank and its affiliates in combating corruption. Id. at 837.
188. Id. at 818. Although the Summit Plan of Action does not define trans-
parency, it does expand on this term by stating that "[a] II aspects of public administra-
tion in a democracy must be transparent and open to public scrutiny," and by calling
for governments to "develop priorities for reforms needed to make government opera-
tions transparent and accountable" and to "[e]nsure proper oversight of government
functions by ...facilitating public access to information necessary for meaningful
outside review." Id.
189. See id. (stating that governments should "develop priorities for reforms
needed to make government operations transparent and accountable").
190. Id. The Summit Plan of Action calls for governments to "[e]nsure proper
oversight of governmental functions by strengthening internal mechanisms, including
investigative and enforcement capacity with respect to acts of corruption, and facilitat-
ing public access to information necessary for meaningful outside review." Id.
191. See id. (calling for governments to "[e]stablish conflict of interest standards
for public employees").
192. Id. The Summit Plan of Action calls for governments to establish "effective
measures against illicit enrichment, including stiff penalties for those who utilize their
public position to benefit private interests."
193. See id. (requesting governments to "[glive priority to strengthening govern-
ment relations and procurement, tax collection, the administration ofjustice and the
electoral and legislative process, utilizing the support of the IDB [the Inter-American
Development Bank] and other international financial institutions where appropriate").
194. Id. The Summit Plan of Action calls on the governments of the world "to
adopt and enforce measures against bribery in all financial or commercial transactions
with the Hemisphere." Id.
195. See id. (inviting the OAS "to establish a liaison with the OECD Working Group
on Bribery in International Business Transactions").
196. Id. The Summit Plan of Action calls on governments to "[d]evelop mecha-
nisms of cooperation in the judicial and banking areas to make possible rapid and
effective response in the international investigation of corruption cases." Id.
1456 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:1427
development of a regional, coordinated approach to combating
corruption in the form of an international agreement that would
allow for extradition and prosecution for violations.
1 97
The OAS gave effect to the anti-corruption measures of its
Summit Plan of Action on March 29, 1996 in Caracas, Vene-
zuela, when it opened the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption for signature. 198 Twenty-three members had signed
the Convention as of March 18, 1997.199 The Convention is also
open for non-OAS member accession.2 00  Any signatory may
make reservations20 1 as to any specific provision of the Conven-
tion, provided that such reservations are not incompatible with
the Convention's object and purpose.0 2 As of March 18, 1997,
only Paraguay and Bolivia had ratified the Convention. 20 3 Con-
197. See id. at 818-19 (calling for the development within the OAS, "with due re-
gard to applicable treaties and national legislation, a hemispheric approach to acts of
corruption in both the public and private sectors that would include extradition and
prosecution of individuals so charged, through negotiation of a new hemispheric agree-
ment or new arrangements within existing frameworks for international cooperation").
198. Convention, supra note 10.
199. Letter from Edwin Choy, Secretary, Department of International Law of the
Secretariat for Legal Affairs, Organization of American States, to Robert H. Sutton,
Staff Member, Fordham International Law Journal 3 (Mar. 18, 1997) (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
200. Convention, supra note 10, art. XXIII, at 733.
201. REsTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 313 (1986); see CARTER & TRIM-
BLE, supra note 103, at 139-41 (discussing reservations to treaties, generally). If a party
to a treaty wishes to accept most, but not all, of the treaty's obligations, it may seek to
enter a reservation to the treaty. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 103, at 139. The party
may wish to do so:
[E]ither because it does not agree with a particular provision, or because it
does not wish to accept a dispute settlement provision (such as reference of
disputes to the ICJ [the International Court ofJustice]), or because it does not
have constitutional power to accept a particular provision (e.g., a federal state
may not be able to bind its constituent states or provinces).
Id. Once a party enters a reservation to a treaty, the reservation "modifies the relevant
provisions of the agreement as to the relations between the reserving and accepting
state parties but does not modify those provisions" as to the relations between the non-
reserving parties. RE SATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAw § 313(3) (1986).
202. Convention, supra note 10, art. XXIV, at 733.
203. Letter from Edwin Choy, supra note 199, at 3. Paraguay and Bolivia ratified
the Convention on November 29, 1996 andJanuary 23, 1997, respectively. Id. Pursuant
to Article XXII of the Convention, Paraguay and Bolivia deposited their instruments of
ratification with the General Secretariat of the OAS on January 28 and February 4,
1997, respectively. Convention, supra note 10, art. XXII, at 733; letter from Edwin
Choy, supra note 199, at 3. Given that Article XXV of the Convention states that the
Convention "shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of
the second instrument of ratification," the Convention has been in force between Para-
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sequently, it is only binding as to those two states.2 0 4 Taken as a
whole, the Convention involves both state-level and transna-
tional approaches, attacking individual acts of corruption and
the systems which permit such acts to flourish,0 5 as well as pro-
moting cooperation among states in a collective effort to eradi-
206cate corruption.
The Convention opens with a reiteration of the harmful ef-
fects of corruption. 0 7 These were effects that the OAS had rec-
ognized in the Summit Declaration and the Summit Plan of Ac-
tion .20  The Preamble to the Convention states that corruption
undermines the legitimacy of public institutions.20 9 It also de-
clares that the proper functioning of representative democracy,
which is itself essential to the region's stability and development,
requires an absence of corruption. 210  Finally, the preamble
notes that corruption has international dimensions, requiring
coordinated regional efforts. 11
On the individual party level, the Convention primarily
mandates active measures for its parties.2 1 2 It mandates criminal-
guay and Bolivia since March 6, 1997. Convention, supra note 10, art. XXV, at 734;
letter from Edwin Choy, supra note 199, at 3.
204. Convention, supra note 10, art. XXV, at 734; letter from Edwin Choy, supra
note 199, at 3.
205. Convention, supra note 10, art. VI-IX, XI, at 729-31.
206. Id. art. XIII-XVI, at 731-32.
207. Id. pmbl., at 727.
208. Compare Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, supra note 179, at 810-
11, (declaring OAS's commitment to promotion of representative democracy, to peace-
ful resolution of disputes through coordinated efforts, and to "a comprehensive attack
on corruption as a factor of social disintegration and distortion of the economic system
that undermines the legitimacy of political institutions") and id. at 818-19 (calling for
measures for states to take in eradicating corruption), with Convention, supra note 10,
pmbl., at 727 (discussing harmful effects of corruption on economies and democratic
institutions and stating that "in some cases, corruption has international dimensions,
which requires coordinated action by States to fight it effectively").
209. Convention, supra note 10, pmbl., at 727.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. arts. V-VI, IX, at 729-30; see id. art. VII, at 730 (calling for parties that have
not yet done so to "adopt the necessary legislative or other measures to establish as
criminal offenses under their domestic law the acts of corruption described in Article
VI(1) and to facilitate cooperation among themselves pursuant to this Convention").
Although the Convention opens by stating that the OAS members "have agreed" to
adopt the Convention's measures, it contains no formal enforcement provisions to en-
sure that parties adopt the Convention's measures. Id. pmbl., at 727. Parties may even
make reservations to the Conventions specific provisions. Id. art. XXIV, at 733; see supra
note 201 (discussing reservations to treaties). Parties may also submit amending proto-
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izing certain specific corruption-related offenses including extor-
tion by, or bribery of, government officials or functionaries2 13 as
well as acts related to bribery and extortion.21 4 It also criminal-
izes transnational bribery.2 15 Finally, the Convention criminal-
izes any significant increase in the assets of a government official
that he cannot explain in relation to his lawful earnings216 and
any use of government resource by a government official or
functionary for non-official purposes.21 7 The Convention also
commands its parties to enact sufficient jurisdictional measures
to give effect to these criminalization provisions.2 as Parties also
may enact broader measures than the Convention specifically
enumerates. 9
The Convention calls for signatories to adopt certain regula-
tory schemes.2 Some of these measures contemplate an active
role for the respective governments, mandating the establish-
ment of standards of conduct for their officials and functiona-
221 2ries, 1 mechanisms for enforcing these standards,222 and systems
cols if consistent with the Convention's purposes, and may denounce the Convention at
any time. Convention, supra note 10, arts. XXVI-XXVII, at 734. For a party to de-
nounce the Convention it must deposit the instrument of denunciation with the Gen-
eral Secretariat of the OAS. Id. arts. XXVI-XXVII, at 734. One year from the date of
deposit, the Convention ceases to be in force for the denouncing state, but remains in
force as to other parties. Id. arts. XXVI-XXVII, at 734.
213. Convention, supra note 10, art. VI I(a)-(b), art. VII, at 729-30; see supra
notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing definitions of bribery and extortion).
214. Convention, supra note 10, art. VI I 1(c)-(e), at 729. The Convention
criminalizes acts or omissions performed by government officials or functionaries for
the purpose of illicitly obtaining some benefit, the fraudulent use or concealment of
property obtained through such transactions, and participation as principal, instigator,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact in such a transaction. Id. art. VI 1 1 (c)-(e), at
729. The Convention also states that it "shall also be applicable by mutual agreement
between or among two or more States Parties with respect to any other act of corrup-
tion" which it does not describe. Id. art. VI 1 1 (e), at 729.
215. Id. art. VIII, at 730. Transnational bribery is bribery by a party's citizens or
domiciliaries of the government officials or functionaries of another state. Id. This
provision is also subject to the party's Constitution and to "the fundamental principles
of its legal system." Id.
216. Id. art. IX, at 730. This provision is subject to the fundamental principles of
the party's legal system and to its Constitution. Id.
217. Id. art. XI I(a)-(d), at 730-31.
218. Id. art. V, at 729.
219. Id.
220. Id. art. III, at 728-29.
221. Id. art. III 1 1, at 728. Although the Convention does not give examples of
these standards, it does state that they "shall be intended to prevent conflicts of interest
and mandate the proper conservation and use of resources entrusted to government
officials in the performance of their functions." Id. art. III 11, at 728. It also declares
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for instructing their officials and functionaries regarding these
standards.2 The Convention also calls for its parties to adopt
various passive regulatory measures to promote transparency
both in the actions of business investors and in those of the par-
ticipating government officials and functionaries. 4 Such meas-
ures include the public registration of functionaries' income,225
the promotion of openness, equity, and efficiency in govern-
ment hiring and procurement,2 6 the use of tax collection sys-
tems in ways that discourage and even actively deter corrup-
tion,2 2 7 and the adoption of other deterrents to the bribery of
domestic and foreign government officials.228 To take full ad-
vantage of the transparency these passive measures create, the
Convention calls for the protection of those who report acts of
corruption,2 29 the creation of official oversight bodies,23 ' and
that these standards should "establish measures and systems requiring government offi-
cials to report to appropriate authorities acts of corruption in the performance of pub-
lic functions." Id. art. III 1, at 728. The Convention also calls for parties to undertake
a "study of further preventive measures that take into account the relationship between
equitable compensation and probity in public service." Id. art. III 12, at 729.
222. Id. art. III 2, at 728. The Convention gives no examples of mechanisms for
enforcing standards of conduct. Id.
223. Id. art. III 3, at 728. The Convention provides no illustrations of systems of
instruction. Id. A working document which the Office of the Secretary General of the
OAS has prepared, however, entitled A Plan of Action Against Corruption ("Working
Plan"), calls for "the organization of workshops, seminars, and conferences with partici-
pation of experts that can help the governments train officials responsible for prevent-
ing and punishing crimes of corruption." Office of the Secretary General of the Organ-
ization of American States, A Plan of Action Against Corruption 24 (May 1996) (work-
ing document, on file with Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Working
Plan].
224. Convention, supra note 10, art. III 4-11, at 728-29.
225. Id. art. III 4, at 728.
226. Id. art. III 5, at 728.
227. Id. art. III 6-7, at 728.
228. Id. art. III 10, at 728. By way of illustration, the Convention provides that
these deterrents may include "mechanisms to ensure that publicly held companies and
other types of associations maintain books and records which, in reasonable detail, ac-
curately reflect the acquisition and disposition of assets, and have sufficient internal
accounting controls to enable their officers to detect corrupt acts." Id. art. III 10, at
728.
229. Id. art. III 8, at 728. This paragraph calls for the protection of "public
servants and private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of corruption". Id. art. III
8, at 728.
230. Id. art. III 9, at 728. Although the Convention does not provide details as to
the structure and powers of the oversight bodies which Article III, paragraph nine, calls
for, it does state that parties should create these bodies "with a view to implementing
modern mechanisms for preventing, detecting, punishing and eradicating corrupt
acts." Id. art. III 9, at 728. The Working Plan also discusses this provision, calling for
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the encouragement of oversight by civil society.
23
'
The Convention also takes a transnational approach to com-
bating corruption.232 The Convention provides that all offenses
criminalized under the Convention's enacting legislation are ex-
traditable. 33 Parties must, upon another party's request, extra-
dite persons within their boundaries who have committed such
offenses.234 The Convention's mutual assistance provisions call
for mutual assistance and cooperation among parties not only in
investigating and prosecuting specific acts of corruption 235 but
also in developing general methods of preventing, detecting, in-
vestigating, and punishing acts of corruption.23 6 These provi-
sions also call for mutual assistance in identifying, tracing, freez-
ing, seizing, and forfeiting the proceeds obtained from or used
in the offenses described in the Convention.23 7 As an additional
incentive for mutual cooperation, the Convention bars the invo-
cation of bank secrecy as grounds for refusing assistance to a
requesting state. 3
The Office of the Secretary General of the OAS has pre-
pared a working document, entitled A Plan of Action Against
Corruption ("Working Plan"), in an effort to develop further its
collective measures approach.239 The Working Plan calls for the
OAS to establish information services, in the form of databases
the OAS to maintain a database on measures which parties to the Convention have
taken in the creation of these bodies. Working Plan, supra note 223, at 15-17.
231. Convention, supra note 10, art. III 11, at 729. In addition, the Working Plan
calls for the OAS "together with other organizations and institutions . . . [to] move
ahead in the definition of programs for strengthening the role of civil society in the
prevention and control of corruption, in accordance with the provisions of the Conven-
tion and other instruments of the inter-American system that are in force." Working
Plan, supra note 223, at 30.
232. Convention, supra note 10, art. XIII-XVI, at 731-32. The Convention also
emphasizes the need for collective measures in its Preamble, stating that OAS members
recognize that "in some cases, corruption has international dimensions, which requires
coordinated action by States to fight it effectively." Id. pmbl., at 727.
233. Id. art. XIII 1-4, 7, at 731. The extradition mandate is also subject to "the
conditions provided for by the law of the Requested State or by applicable extradition
treaties, including the grounds on which the Requested State may refuse extradition."
Id. art. XIII 1 5, at 731.
234. Id. art. XIII 11 1-4, 7, at 731.
235. Id. art. XIV 1 1, at 732. The mutual assistance and cooperation mandate is
subject to parties' domestic laws. Id. art. XIV 1, at 732.
236. Id. art. XIV 1 2, at 732.
237. Id. art. XV 1, at 732.
238. Id. art. XVI 1 1, at 732.
239. Working Plan, supra note 223, at 1-33.
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of measures that parties have taken in furtherance of the Con-
ventions' mandates, in order to facilitate a coordinated ap-
proach to combating corruption.2" These services would moni-
tor and provide information to parties on such topics as effective
means for giving effect to the preventive regulatory measures in
Article III of the Convention, 4 ' legislative measures effective
both in generally combating corruption and in giving effect to
specific mandates of the Convention,24 2 and current projects
and research on matters related to the fight against corrup-
tion.2 43 The Working Plan also advocates proposing model laws
to serve as guidelines for parties.2 " These model laws would aid
in creating an approach to combating corruption that is unified
across the region.2 4  Finally, the Working Plan advocates coop-
eration with other international organizations, such as the
OECD,' 2 1 the World Bank,2 47 the Inter-American Development
Bank,248 the United Nations,2 "49 and other international organi-
zations and agencies, 250 noting that there may be much to gain
from their shared and complementary interests in the anti-cor-
240. Id. at 15-19.
241. Id. at 16-17. Measures for giving effect to the preventive regulatory measures
in Article III of the Convention include establishing standards of conduct, establishing
systems for registering income, and establishing systems of government hiring and pro-
curement. Id.
242. Id. at 17-19.
243. Id. at 19.
244. Id. at 19-20. The Working Plan notes that "model laws have proved useful" in
the past and that OAS members have recognized their value. Id. at 19. It suggests that
"model laws could serve as a guideline and source of support and information for the
countries to make the corresponding elections within the framework of their constitu-
tional system and their individual circumstances." Id. at 20.
245. Id. at 19-20.
246. Id. at 26-29.
247. Id. at 25-26. The World Bank is an organization which, through loaning oper-
ations, strives for the promotion of "economic and social progress in developing na-
tions, bringing poor nations to a point of self-sustaining development." CARTER & TRIM-
BLE, supra note 103, at 530. The World Bank will only loan to governments or to enti-
ties whose governments guarantee the loan. Id.
248. Working Plan, supra note 223, at 25-26. The Inter-American Development
Bank is a regional development bank for Latin America modeled on the World Bank,
although the Inter-American Development Bank's assets amount to substantially less
than the World Bank's. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 103, at 547. The Inter-American
Development Bank functions to increase the availability of development funds, target-
ing them on the nations of the Americas. Id. at 498.
249. Working Plan, supra note 223, at 29.
250. Id. at 29. Such organizations include the Council of Europe and the Euro-
pean Union. Id.
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ruption arena.251
2. Recommendations of the Council of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
On May 27, 1994, the OECD Council passed the Recom-
mendation on Bribery in International Business Transactions
("Bribery Recommendation") .252 The Bribery Recommendation
is primarily a collection of admonitions and recommendations
as to general areas in which to take action rather than an articu-
lation of specific measures. 53 The Bribery Recommendation
recognizes the pervasive nature of corruption and the problems
corruption poses for both governments and commercial mar-
kets.2 154 It also advocates that its members adopt various deter-
rent, preventive, and combative measures in the fight against
transnational bribery.25 5 These measures include domestic ac-
tions such as enacting legislative prohibitions, 56 reformulating
tax regulations in a manner that does not indirectly encourage
bribery,257 establishing business accounting procedures that en-
sure the adequate recording of relevant payments,258 and ensur-
ing that banks make records available for investigative pur-
poses.25 9 Other measures include cooperative action, such as
mutually aiding the investigations of other member-states by
sharing information, 260 extraditing suspects,2 61 and promoting
251. Id. at 25.
252. Bribery Recommendation, supra note 12, at 1390-92.
253. See id. I I, at 1390 (recommending that members "take effective measures to
deter, prevent and combat bribery"); id. III, at 1391 (recommending that members
examine certain areas of legislation and regulation and take "concrete and meaningful
steps" to combat bribery, providing an open-ended list of suggestions of what such steps
may include); id. I IV(ii)-(iii), at 1391 (recommending that members "make full use of
existing agreements" for mutual legal assistance or enter into new ones where necessary
and ensure "that their national laws afford an adequate basis for this cooperation").
254. Id. pmbl., at 1390. The OECD Council Recommendation on Bribery in Inter-
national Business Transactions ("Bribery Recommendation") observes that bribery in
international business transactions raises "serious moral and political concerns" and is
responsible for "distorting international competitive conditions". Id. pmbl., at 1390.
255. Id. I, at 1390-91.
256. Id. IH(i)-(ii), at 1391.
257. Id. III(iii), at 1391. The indirect encouragement of bribery, which the Brib-
ery Recommendation seeks to eliminate, includes classification of bribes as tax deducti-
ble. Id. I III(iii), at 1391.
258. Id. III(iv), at 1391.
259. Id. I I(v), at 1391.
260. Id. IV(i), at 1391.
261. Id. IV(i), at 1391.
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the Bribery Recommendation's goals among non-members.262
The Bribery Recommendation also specifically advocates the
withholding of subsidies, licenses, government procurement
contracts, and other public advantages as sanctions for infrac-
tions.263 Finally, the OECD Council's recent passage on April
11, 1996 of the Recommendation On the Tax Deductibility of
Bribes To Foreign Public Officials ("Tax Recommendation")2 64
demonstrates its commitment to eradicate corruption, attacking
as it does an institution that indirectly favors it, the tax system.265
To this end, the Tax Recommendation calls for members to re-
examine their tax laws with a view to denying to corporations the
possible deductibility of bribes to foreign public officials.266 The
Tax Recommendation also calls for its promotion among non-
members and for a monitoring of its implementation.2 67
3. Corporate Self-Regulation
At least one commentator has suggested that commercial
entities may be best-suited to regulating corruption in interna-
tional markets. 268 This suggestion holds that codes of corporate
conduct bring predictability and certainty to government-corpo-
ration relationships. 69 It further asserts that private codes also
may accomplish many of the goals that government anti-corrup-
262. Id. V-VII, at 1392.
263. Id. III(vi), at 1391.
264. Tax Recommendation, supra note 12.
265. Id. at 1311-12.
266. Id. at 1312. The OECD Council Recommendation On the Tax Deductibility
of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials ("Tax Recommendation") recommends "that those
Member countries which do not disallow the deductibility of bribes to foreign public
officials re-examine such treatment with the intention of denying such deductibility.
Such action may be facilitated by the trend to treat bribes to foreign officials as illegal."
Id. at 1312.
267. Id. at 1312. The Tax Recommendation instructs the Committee on Fiscal
Affairs, in cooperation with the Committee on International Investment and Multina-
tional Enterprises, "to monitor the implementation of this Recommendation, to pro-
mote the Recommendation in the context of contacts with non-member countries and
to report to the Council as appropriate." Id. at 1312.
268. See Baker, supra note 7, at 399-433 (arguing that corporate self-regulation
offers most effective method for controlling corruption).
269. Id. at 414-15. Private codes:
[E]nsure that MNEs [multi-national entities] are in harmony with the national
policies of the countries where they operate and also strengthen the mutual
confidence between the MNE and the government of the host country. Pri-
vate codes increase political stability in developing nations by increasing the
host country's negotiating power with the MNE. Voluntary codes of conduct
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tion schemes attain, such as stimulating economic development
in certain areas,270 redistributing wealth to the labor class, 71 and
discouraging anti-competitive and illegal behavior. 2  This argu-
ment notes that self-imposed codes also provide producers a cer-
tain flexibility in their operations, allowing producers to address
their individual concerns2 73 and realize higher profits.2 74  Fi-
nally, this argument states that these codes promote goodwill be-
tween corporations, foreign governments, and foreign nationals
instead of establishing an adversarial relationship.275
One criticism of the use of private codes of corporate con-
duct to combat corruption is that corporations may often cir-
cumvent these private codes quite easily.276 In the United States,
for example, most courts will not hold private codes to be legally
binding instruments. 27 7 Another criticism is that the often high
can increase public trust in the business sector and bring multinational activity
in line with public expectations.
Id.
270. Id. at 406.
271. Id. These private codes may accomplish such redistribution through an in-
crease in wages to the corporations' laborers. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 415-16. One commentator observes that, "(b]y developing individual-
ized codes of conduct, MNEs [multi-national entities] can tailor a code to their own
needs and to the needs of their customers." Id. at 415; see id. at 415-16 (noting varying
concerns one corporation may face in its operations in different parts of "a diverse and
ever-changing world").
274. Id. at 42i.
275. Id. at 422. As one commentator notes, adherence to these codes of conduct
"develops trust in the relationship between the MNE [multi-national entity] and its sup-
pliers, host government, and customers. Suspicion historically surrounds the activities
of MNEs abroad. Alleviation of this suspicion is the chief benefit of writing and adher-
ing to an internal code." Id.
276. Id. at 416-17.
277. Id. at 416-17 & n.106. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing
Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO.
L.J. 1559, 1605-14 (1990) (discussing low level of protection that private codes provide
corporations against civil and criminal liability). Fundamental agency principles play a
large part in this lack of protection. See United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570,
573 (4th Cir.) (stating that corporations may be held criminally liable for acts of their
employees if those employees "were acting within the scope of their authority, or appar-
ent authority, and for the benefit of the corporation, even if... such acts were against
corporate policy or express instructions."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); see also
United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding "[w]e agree with the District Court that Fox's compliance program, however
extensive, does not immunize the corporation from liability when its employees, acting
within the scope of their authority, fail to comply with the law and the consent de-
cree."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990).
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cost of negotiating private codes, even if such codes pertain to
only one corporation, decrease profits for shareholders. 7 This
high cost acts as a disincentive to forming comprehensive poli-
cies.279
B. State-Level Approaches
A different set of proposals attacks corruption on a local
level. 8 ° Some of these proposals target individual components
of the commercial system, advocating regulatory measures in-
stead of criminal sanctions and focusing on the acts of individu-
als instead of the acts of corporations. 81 One proposal, the
FCPA,282 adopts both regulatory and criminalization measures
and targets both individuals and corporations. 83
1. Criminalization Versus Regulation
At least one commentator has suggested that controlling
any aspect of corporate conduct through the criminal justice sys-
tem may not be the best available approach, suggesting instead
the use of regulatory measures.284 This school of thought argues
that governments' concerns in any arena relating to regulation
of conduct is to maximize the government's effect on the popu-
lace's behavior with the minimum expenditure. 83 In this re-
gard, the argument states, a criminalizing approach may not
make the most effective use of governments' resources.286 This
argument holds that regulatory agencies are usually able to pur-
sue violations more economically and are usually less encum-
bered with burden-of-proof and motive issues. 87 It also states
that regulatory agencies often possess significant investigative
powers and are able to investigate the facts of a transaction with-
278. Baker, supra note 7, at 417. Companies may offset the costs associated with
creating a code with the potential benefits the company will gain, such as increased
commercial flexibility and promotion of goodwill. Id. at 417-18.
279. Id. at 417-18.
280. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1988); Geis & DiMento, supra note 11, at 72-86;
Levi, supra note 11, at 181-98.
281. Geis & DiMento, supra note 11, at 72-86; Levi, supra note 11, at 181-98.
282. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m(b), 78m(d)(1), 78m(g), 78m(h), 78dd-1, 78dd-2,
78ff(a), 78ff(c) (1988).
283. Id
284. Levi, supra note 11, at 181-98.
285. Id. at 181.
286. Id. at 184-85.
287. Id.
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out the constraints that hinder other law-enforcement agen-
cies. 88
A counterargument to the use of regulatory measures to
combat corruption states that the scope of prosecutorial investi-
gative powers tends to be broader than that which regulatory
agencies typically possess. 28 9 According to this counterargu-
ment, a criminalizing approach would allow for more thorough
examinations of the alleged transactions in question.2 90 An addi-
tional counterargument states that the adverse publicity arising
through a criminal prosecution does not exist to the same extent
in a purely regulatory investigation.2 91 The social stigma that ac-
companies action society defines as criminal is often absent, or
at least much weaker, with actions society deems to be mere reg-
ulatory infractions. 292 Other commentators disagree with this as-
sertion, however, noting that the adverse effects to a corporation
flowing from publicity of criminal prosecutions are short-lived
and the resulting deterrent effect minimal. 93
2. Targeting Individuals versus Targeting Corporations
Other commentators suggest that governments may control
corporate actions more effectively by attacking the individuals
involved in the transactions in question as opposed to attacking
the corporations for which these individuals work.294 These
commentators suggest that, although a corporation's actions are
an amalgam of numerous individual decisions and contribu-
tions, it is often possible, albeit time-consuming, to identify indi-
vidual acts and isolate the blame. 295 They argue that pursuing
288. Id. Professor Levi notes that, in recent years, courts have manifested an "in-
creasingly critical approach to the use of powers by the police". Id. at 187.
289. See id. at 186-88 (discussing powers available to prosecutorial investigators of
white-collar crime in England, such as absence of bank secrecy and right to silence as
bars to inquiry).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 181, 188-89. Publicity in a criminal investigation often draws public
scrutiny and shame upon the corrupt individual or entity currently under investigation,
thereby providing a cost-effective means of deterring future corrupt transactions. Id.
292. Id.
293. SeeJACOBY ET AL., supra note 3, at 51-57 (concluding from 30-day studies of
five companies' stock prices that investors do not make "any significant disposal of their
stocks on learning of the overseas political payments by the managements" of compa-
nies studied).
294. Geis & DiMento, supra note 11, at 72-86.
295. Id. at 77.
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individuals instead of corporations may increase deterrents to il-
licit behavior. 96 They note that individuals are more likely to
take steps to protect themselves by avoiding the breaking of laws
than they are to protect the corporations for which they work,
taking advantage of the individuals' inclination to self-interest.29 7
These commentators also suggest that common
prosecutorial practices in pursuing corporations2 9 and individu-
als' awareness of these practices generally reduce pressures on
employees to obey the law, thereby perpetuating the system that
allows such acts to persist.2 99 They note that, even if prosecutors
have the option to pursue an individual as opposed to the corpo-
ration he or she works for, it is often less complicated for the
prosecutor to establish general corporate guilt than it is to iden-
tify responsible individuals.3"' This effect removes some of the
fear that prosecutors may target them in their individual capaci-
ties.30 1 For example, investigators can usually uncover the paper
trail more easily when corporations are the target of the investi-
gation because corporations, unlike individuals, have no privi-
lege against self-incrimination in the United States.30 2 These
commentators recognize that individuals are often more willing
to sacrifice their corporation than themselves. s° They also ob-
serve that the common practice in the United States of offering
immunity to individuals who testify against the corporation fur-
ther erodes the fears an individual may have of being pursued in
his personal capacity.304 Finally, they remark that a corporation
is more likely than an individual to have the funds available to
repair the harm flowing from the criminal transaction in ques-
tion, making them the natural deep pocket in the eyes of the
prosecutor. 05
A critique of this approach notes that court sanctions are
296. Id. at 79-80.
297. Id.




302. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974) (holding that "no artificial or-
ganization may utilize the personal privilege against compulsory self-incrimination");
Geis & DiMento, supra note 11, at 81-82.
303. Geis & DiMento, supra note 11, at 81-82.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 82-83.
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capable of redesigning corporations with relative ease, given that
corporations are artificially created entities existing largely in pa-
per form.3"6 Individuals, by contrast, are much less amenable to
rehabilitation. 0 1 In addition, there are fewer complications in
establishing corporate, as opposed to individual, guilt.3 8 Fi-
nally, this critique notes that there may be a greater potential for
correcting the harm flowing from criminal transactions if investi-
gators pursue corporations as opposed to individuals, because a
corporation's vast collective assets make it the deep pocket of
choice when compared to an individual's relatively meager hold-
ings.30 9
3. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The FCPA adopts a combination of approaches to combat-
ing corruption by taking criminalizing as well as regulatory ap-
proaches310 and by targeting individuals as well as corpora-
tions.3 1' The FCPA criminalizes corrupt payments that any
agent of a publicly-held U.S. corporation may make to any for-
eign official, foreign political party, or candidate for foreign of-
fice. x  This provision applies if the agent makes the payment
306. Id. at 80-81.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 81-82; see supra notes 298-305 and accompanying text (discussing prose-
cutors' incentives to pursue corporations in lieu of individuals).
309. Geis & DiMento, supra note 11, at 82-83; see supra notes 298-305 and accompa-
nying text (discussing inclination of prosecutors to focus efforts on corporations not
individuals).
310. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m(b), 78m(d)(1), 78m(g), 78m(h), 78dd-1, 78dd-2,
78ff(a), 78ff(c) (1988).
311. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1988).
312. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), 78dd-1(a)(2), 78dd-I(a)(3) (1988). These Sec-
tions provide:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a class of securities registered
pursuant to section 781 of this title or which is required to file reports under
section 78o(d) of this title, or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of
such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, to make
use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce cor-
ruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of
the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of
the giving of anything of value to-(l) any foreign official... (2) any foreign
political party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign political office
... (3) any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing
of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any for-
eign official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candi-
date for foreign political office.
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directly or through an intermediary. 313 Additionally, the FCPA
criminalizes any payments that individual citizens, nationals, or
residents of the United States who are not publicly-held entities
may make to these same foreign persons.314 The FCPA also
adopts some regulatory measures, mandating accurate book-
keeping practices that adequately disclose the nature of an en-
tity's expenditures. 3 5  Finally, the FCPA deliberately exempts
from its coverage the most pervasive form of corrupt payments,
the facilitating payment.31 6 The statute lists as an affirmative de-
Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. These Sections provide:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern, other than an issuer which is
subject to section 78dd-1 of this tide, or for any officer, director, employee, or
agent of such domestic concern or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of
such domestic concern, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift,
promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to-(1) any
foreign official . . . (2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any
candidate for foreign political office... (3) any person, while knowing that all
or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or prom-
ised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign political party
or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political office.
Id.
315. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2) (1988). This Section provides:
Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 781 of
this title and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section
78o(d) of this title shall-(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts,
which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and (B) devise and maintain a system of
internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances
that-(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general
or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to per-
mit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and
(II) to maintain accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only
in accordance with management's general or specific authorization; and (iv)
the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at
reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differ-
ences.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1988).
316. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b) (1988); seeJAcoBY ET AL., supra note 3, at
113 (stating that facilitating payments are most common form of corrupt payment).
Both Section 78dd-1 (b) and Section 78dd-2(b) exempt facilitating or expediting pay-
ments from prohibition. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b) (1988). These Sections
each exempt any payment "to a foreign official, political party, or party official the
purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmen-
tal action by a foreign official, political party, or party official." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (b),
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fense the fact that the payment in question was to secure per-
formance of a routine governmental action such as obtaining a
permit, processing a visa, or providing mail service.317
III. ADVOCATING THE OAS APPROACH
The Convention clearly poses the most effective of existing
solutions to the problems that corruption poses.3 1 8 Given cor-
ruption's pervasive and universally harmful nature, combating
corruption requires a collective approach. 319 As such, the Con-
vention provides an effective means for combating corrup-
tion.32 ° Although other approaches to combating corruption do
possess some advantages, they are less effective than the Conven-
tion.32' In addition, the OAS approach combines the advantages
that these other existing approaches possess.322 Finally, the OAS
approach is more specific in its provisions than other existing
approaches, allowing for the necessary coordination of efforts
among states.323
78dd-2(b) (1988). Sections 78dd-1 (f) (3) and 78dd-2(h) (4) each define "routine gov-
ernmental action" as:
[A] n action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official
in-(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a
person to do business in a foreign country; (ii) processing governmental pa-
pers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing police protection, mail pick-
up, and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract perform-
ance or inspections related to transit of goods across country; (iv) providing
phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or pro-
tecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or (v) actions
of a similar nature.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l (ff)(3), 78dd-2(h)(4).
317. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b) (1988).
318. See supra notes 198-238 and accompanying text (examining provisions of Con-
vention).
319. See supra notes 53-63, 88-95 and accompanying text (explaining pervasiveness
and political effects of corruption).
320. See supra notes 118-48 and accompanying text (examining purposes of OAS
which corruption adversely affects); see supra notes 198-238 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing measures Convention proposes for combating corruption).
321. See supra notes 252-317 and accompanying text (reviewing OECD Council
Recommendations, corporate self-regulation, regulatory measures, and targeting indi-
viduals who engage in corrupt practices as alternate approaches capable of combating
corruption).
322. See supra notes 212-38 and accompanying text (discussing Convention's anti-
corruption measures, including criminalization and regulation of corrupt activities and
international cooperative provisions).
323. See supra notes 212-38 and accompanying text (commenting on measures
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A. Combating Corruption Requires a Collective Approach
The prevalence of corruption necessitates a collective ap-
proach to combating it.32 4 Corruption's often long existence
and its reinforcement by local social structures has led to its en-
trenchment in the practices of both commercial and govern-
ment actors the world over.3 25 Consequently, the entity seeking
to eradicate corruption from a given location must have a cer-
tain degree of independence from the location in question. 2
6
Such independence allows the correcting entity the necessary
separation from the corrupt influences, influences that would
perhaps corrupt the correcting entity itself.32 7 A collective ap-
proach thus fulfills this need for separation from the source of
the corruption.2 8
The kinds of problems corruption poses also requires a col-
lective approach.3 29 As commentators have noted, a prevalence
of corrupt payments poses additional and numerous costs on
participants in corrupt markets. 33 ° Although corruption hinders
the efficient functioning of individual markets,31 the ultimate
damage is not limited to the individual markets in question.33 2
The resulting slowdown in economic development and political
destabilization affects the host state and neighboring states
Convention proposes for combating corruption, such as criminalization and regulation
of corrupt activities and international cooperative provisions).
324. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text (explaining corruption's exist-
ence throughout history and throughout world).
325. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text (discussing pervasive and
lengthy existence of corruption).
326. See supra notes 33-52 and accompanying text (referring to prevalence of cor-
ruption in international business transactions).
327. See supra notes 33-52 and accompanying text (explaining corruption's perva-
sive existence in international business transactions).
328. See supra notes 198-251 (discussing Convention's anti-corruption measures);
see supra notes 252-67 (presenting OECD Council recommendations' measures for com-
bating corruption); see supra notes 268-79 and accompanying text (reviewing combating
corruption through private codes of corporate conduct).
329. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing political effects of
corruption including discouraging infrastructure development and engendering polit-
ical instability).
330. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text (explaining corruption's harm-
ful economic effects such as wasted resources and increased transaction costs).
331. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text (discussing corruption as type of
transactional barrier).
332. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing corruption's political
effects including political destabilization and decrease in development of infrastruc-
ture).
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alike. 33 Given corruption's universally harmful nature, the
need for collective action to combat it is clearly apparent. 334
B. The OAS Approach Provides an Effective Means for Combating
Corruption
The organization and goals of the OAS make the OAS well-
suited to addressing corruption and its effects on the states of
the Western Hemisphere. 35 The OAS has pledged to further
the region's socioeconomic development and ensure its stability,
the very things corruption endangers. 336  The OAS also places
heavy emphasis on the importance of cooperative action, espe-
cially as such action relates to furthering regional economic de-
velopment and stability.337 The OAS is, therefore, an appropri-
ate source to turn to in seeking a solution to the problems cor-
ruption poses.338
The Convention is an effective means of putting the OAS's
anti-corruption measures into effect. 339 Given that corruption
poses state-level problems with transnational effects,3 40 it is fit-
ting that the Convention should apply its state-level provisions in
a transnational approach, thereby allowing for comprehensive
treatment.3 41 The Convention's state-level provisions actively at-
tack specifically-enumerated occurrences of corruption and reg-
ulate specific, corruption-prone aspects of commercial mar-
333. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (reviewing political effects of
corruption).
334. See supra notes 53-95 and accompanying text (discussing corruption's history
and harmful effects).
335. See supra notes 99-148 and accompanying text (discussing OAS's organization
and goals).
336. See supra notes 137-148 and accompanying text (addressing OAS's commit-
ment to fostering regional socioeconomic development through cooperative efforts).
337. See supra notes 137-148 and accompanying text (explaining OAS's develop-
mental goals including collective promotion of socioeconomic development).
338. See supra notes 99-148 and accompanying text (examining organization and
goals of OAS).
339. See supra notes 198-238 and accompanying text (commenting on Conven-
tion's anti-corruption measures).
340. See supra notes 64-95 and accompanying text (explaining state-level and trans-
national problems corruption poses, such as discouraging development and engender-
ing political instability).
341. See supra notes 212-38 and accompanying text (describing Convention's state-
level and transnational approaches to combating corruption).
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kets. 42 The Convention's state-level provisions also establish
measures by which states may passively monitor corrupt activ-
ity.3 43 The Convention's transnational provisions provide a har-
monizing effect by calling for cooperation in investigation, pros-
ecution, and extradition, transforming a series of specific but in-
dependent efforts by individual states into a regional
movement. 3 "4 Finally, the Convention's transnational coopera-
tive measures do not violate the OAS's or United Nations' tenets
of non-intervention. 34 5 Accession to the Convention is voluntary
and any party may make reservations as to any specific provision,
meaning that any measures that a state takes in furtherance of its
obligations are self-imposed. 346 Through the Convention, the
OAS thus proposes an effective vehicle for implementing the re-
forms necessary to eradicate corruption in North and South
America.3 4
7
C. Other Approaches Are Less Effective
Other approaches to combating corruption possess short-
comings that make them less viable options for combating cor-
ruption.348 A purely criminalizing approach does not usually use
resources as effectively as a purely regulatory approach, but the
former is able to achieve deterrence more effectively than the
latter.3 49 An approach that focuses purely on pursuing corpora-
tions does not always achieve the same degree of deterrence that
an approach focusing purely on pursuing individuals achieves,
but the former can often be a more efficient use of resources
342. See supra notes 212-31 and accompanying text (reviewing Convention's state-
level approach).
343. See supra notes 212-31 and accompanying text (discussing state-level efforts of
Convention).
344. See supra notes 232-38 and accompanying text (describing Convention's trans-
national provisions).
345. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (explaining Convention's Res-
ervation provisions).
346. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (addressing Convention's pro-
visions regarding entry of reservations).
347. See supra notes 198-238 and accompanying text (discussing anti-corruption
measures of Convention).
348. See supra notes 252-317 and accompanying text (discussing alternate ap-
proaches to combating corruption).
349. See supra notes 284-93 and accompanying text (discussing criminalization ver-
sus regulation).
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than the latter.3 50 Even the FCPA, a hybrid approach that com-
bines both criminalization and regulatory approaches and
targets both individuals and corporations, has its drawbacks.351
The affirmative defense which the FCPA provides for facilitating
payments allows the persistence of increased barriers to trade
that such additional payments create. 52 The existence of these
barriers to trade blocks potential suppliers from the market,
35 3
prevents foreign consumers from obtaining a better product for
a better price, 3 4 hampers infrastructure development,3 55 and
adds to the region's general instability.
356
In the end, any purely state-level approach will prove inef-
fective in combating corruption because it will not be able to
coordinate measures across a region.357 This inability to coordi-
nate measures may allow corruption to persist, even flourish, in a
neighboring state. 358 Existence of corruption in a state encour-
ages an outflow of capital and other mobile resources from the
corrupted state, making these resources less accessible to neigh-
boring states as well. 359 As resources flow out of a region, fewer
resources are available to aid the region's socioeconomic devel-
opment. 6 ° In addition, the rehabilitative efforts necessary to
correct the injuries corruption inflicts on a state will drain na-
tional resources, diverting them from other, more valuable de-
350. See supra notes 294-309 and accompanying text (addressing pursuing corpora-
tions versus pursuing individuals).
351. See supra notes 310-17 and accompanying text (reviewing FCPA's anti-corrup-
tion measures).
352. See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text (explaining FCPA's affirmative
defense for facilitating payments).
353. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (addressing bribery and other
barriers to trade).
354. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (reviewing economically ineffi-
cient effects of bribery).
355. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text (explaining problems bribery
poses to infrastructure development).
356. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (describing political destabi-
lizing effects that bribery causes).
357. See supra notes 137-148, 169-71 and accompanying text (discussing OAS and
OECD Charters' collective provisions).
358. See supra notes 29-52 and accompanying text (explaining why corruption oc-
curs in international business transactions).
359. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text (addressing corruption's induce-
ment of outflow of resources from regions).
360. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text (describing how corruption
existence in region leads to resources' exodus from that region).
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velopmental uses. 61 This acts as a further retardant to local and
regional development. 62 Finally, the mere existence of such
corruption often erodes public confidence, both domestically
and abroad, in the integrity of the government whose actors re-
ceive these payments."63 Such a loss of faith- and public support
may lead to a general instability of the corrupted state, which
may also affect the stability of neighboring states.3 64 It is thus
apparent that a purely state-level approach will not prove effec-
tive in combating corruption.3 61
Not all transnational approaches to combating corruption
offer effective solutions either .3 1 Although the Bribery Recom-
mendation calls for OECD members to adopt a variety of meas-
ures, its provisions are little more than general admonitions with
little specific direction. 67 This permits adherents to the Bribery
Recommendation to follow its words while enacting vastly differ-
ent measures, preventing a harmonized approach and permit-
ting corruption to persist in certain forms and in certain ar-
eas.3 68 The Bribery Recommendation's advocation of the with-
holding of certain public advantages as sanctions for infractions
is somewhat more specific, and is thus less likely to lead to an
uneven application, than its other provisions.369 It is insuffi-
cient, however, to ensure a uniform application of the document
as a whole.37 0 The Tax Recommendation is also specific in the
361. See supra notes 64-95 and accompanying text (reviewing harmful effects of
corruption).
362. See supra notes 64-95 and accompanying text (enumerating damage corrup-
tion is capable of perpetrating).
363. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (explaining how corruption can
lead to political destabilization).
364. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (referring to corruption as cause
of political destabilization).
365. See supra notes 280-317 and accompanying text (discussing state-level ap-
proaches to combating corruption).
366. See supra notes 252-79 (reviewing OECD Council recommendations and pri-
vate codes of corporate conduct as other transnational measures for combating corrup-
tion).
367. See supra note 253 and accompanying text (referring to non-specific nature of
Bribery Recommendation's admonitions).
368. See supra note 253 and accompanying text (discussing generality of Bribery
Recommendation's provisions).
369. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (addressing Bribery Recommenda-
tion's provision regarding withholding of certain public advantages as sanctions for in-
fractions).
370. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (discussing provision of Bribery
1997] 1475
1476 FORDHAMINTERATATIONALLAWJOURAAL [Vol. 20:1427
measures it advocates and is a step in the right direction, but it
only addresses one area of governmental administration that al-
lows corruption to flourish. 71 The eradication of corruption re-
quires more.372 Finally, private codes of corporate conduct,
although potentially capable of combating corruption through
transnational efforts, pose problems in terms of compliance. 73
The cost of establishing them may also make it unlikely that cor-
porations will spend the time and resources necessary to create
codes comprehensive enough to be effective. 74 The other ex-
isting transnational approaches to combating corruption are,
therefore, unsatisfactory.3 75
D. The OAS Approach Combines Advantages of Other Existing
Approaches
The Convention draws considerable strength from the com-
bination of measures that it adopts, incorporating many of the
more effective elements of the various state-level and transna-
tional approaches that others have advocated.3 76 The Conven-
tion recognizes the benefits of a regulatory approach to combat-
ing corruption by presenting a cost-effective and expedient
means of regulatory control.37 7 The Convention also relies heav-
ily on criminalization measures with their attendant broadened
investigatory powers and stigmatizing effects.3 78 Additionally,
the Convention seizes on the advantages inherent in pursuing
individuals for their roles in corrupt transactions, taking advan-
tage of their natural inclinations to self-interest, while simultane-
Recommendation concerning withholding of certain public advantages as sanctions for
infractions).
371. See supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text (presenting Tax Recommenda-
tion's provisions for denying tax-deductibility of bribes).
372. See supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text (commenting on Tax Recom-
mendation anti-bribery provisions).
373. See supra notes 268-79 and accompanying text (describing private codes of
corporate conduct).
374. See supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text (enumerating costs to corpora-
tions of designing private codes).
375. See supra notes 252-79 and accompanying text (discussing Council recommen-
dations of the OECD and private codes of corporate conduct).
376. See supra notes 212-38 and accompanying text (commenting on Convention's
anti-corruption measures).
377. See supra notes 220-31 and accompanying text (describing Convention's regu-
latory provisions).
378. See supra notes 212-19 and accompanying text (discussing Convention's
criminalization provisions).
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ously pursuing corporations, thereby allowing for less compli-
cated investigations and deeper pockets.3 79 The combination of
measures that the Convention adopts thus allows for a broad and
efficient treatment.380
E. The OAS Approach is More Specific than Other Existing
Approaches
It is the Convention's specificity that. is its greatest
strength. 81 The Convention's principles are well-delineated,
listing specific acts to criminalize, regulations to enact, and
measures to pursue, not merely general categories in which to
act.3 82 For a transnational approach to be effective, it must be
specific in its provisions, allowing for the approach's adherents
to harmonize their actions.383 The ability of parties to follow
closely this specific plan will permit the region to attack corrup-
tion in a forceful and coordinated manner, while minimizing the
possibility that full compliance could still lead to uneven re-
suits.8 84 Finally, the possibility of uneven results is further mini-
mized by the fact that the parties involved may fully enact all the
measures it proposes, subject only to provisions of their constitu-
tions and the fundamental principles of their legal systems. 385
The Convention is, therefore, more than just a well-intentioned
379. See supra notes 212-31, 294-309 and accompanying text (describing Conven-
tion's provisions targeting individuals). While there is the possibility that prosecutors
may continue to be drawn to pursue a corporation as opposed to an individual for a
given transaction, the individual may still be prosecuted for his participation. See supra
note 214 and accompanying text (addressing Convention's provisions regarding prose-
cution of individuals for participation as "principal, coprinciple, instigator, accomplice
or accessory after the fact"). This result thereby preserves some of the deterrent effect.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Convention calling
for prosecution of individuals for participation in any capacity).
380. See supra notes 212-38 and accompanying text (discussing Convention's anti-
corruption measures).
381. See supra notes 212-38 and accompanying text (describing measures Conven-
tion proposes for combating corruption).
382. See supra notes 212-38 and accompanying text (describing Convention's anti-
corruption provisions); see also supra notes 252-67 and accompanying text (referring to
Bribery and Tax Recommendations' anti-corruption provisions).
383. See supra notes 198-238 and accompanying text (discussing Convention's anti-
corruption provisions).
384. See supra notes 212-38 and accompanying text (discussing Convention's anti-
corruption provisions).
385. See supra notes 215-16, 235 and accompanying text (addressing Convention's
caveats regarding parties' legal principles and constitutional provisions).
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586suggestion. It is a comprehensive and coordinated attack that
attempts to level the playing field for all commercial actors, put-
ting no one at a competitive disadvantage.1
8 7
CONCLUSION
The members of the OAS should ratify the Convention and
give full effect to the measures it proposes. The OAS approach
to combating corruption clearly offers more benefits to more
people than does any of the existing alternative approaches. Ac-
tive government involvement in corruption-related regulations
and criminal prosecutions is more likely to open markets to
more investors than any less-involved approach. Although this
increased regulation and interference may initially seem to pose
barriers to investment, these measures will actually create more
investment opportunities than previously existed by eliminating
the existing corruption-related barriers to entry and allowing
markets to develop. These results will become more noticeable
as they in turn effect an increase in the strength of regional in-
frastructure and stability. The well-articulated transnational ap-
proach that the Convention embodies will do much to protect
the inhabitants of the Americas from the ravages of corruption.
Such a dramatic effect in this hemisphere may even have reper-
cussions elsewhere in the world, perhaps acting as a catalyst for
change in other regions. The Convention thus presents a tre-
mendous opportunity, one that states cannot afford to miss.
386. See supra notes 212-38 and accompanying text (enumerating provisions Con-
vention calls for in eradication of corruption); see also supra notes 252-67 and accompa-
nying text (explaining anti-corruption provisions of Bribery and Tax Recommenda-
tions).
387. See supra notes 212-38 and accompanying text (discussing measures Conven-
tion calls for in eradication of corruption); see also supra notes 252-267 and accompany-
ing text (describing measures Bribery and Tax Recommendations advocate).
